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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Focus
Timesharing has spread from the sandy beaches of this country's
coastal resorts to the shores of Minnesota's 10,000 lakes., Real estate
timesharing is the division of a single condominium unit into fractional-
1. See Rosenblatt, Timesharing: Representing Minnesota Developers and Buyers, 51 HENN.
1
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ized ownership, with each owner occupying the unit for a particular time
period. Although graced with numerous attributes, timesharing involves
various legal uncertainties. Effective legislation can resolve these ambi-
guities. A number of state legislatures have already enacted enabling
and regulatory statutes that respond to these problems. 2 Minnesota,
however, lacks a similar response.
3
The Minnesota Legislature can benefit from the experiences of other
states with timesharing, using those experiences to enact its own compre-
hensive legislation. The Legislature has the opportunity to act prospec-
tively rather than reacting after problems emerge, to insure that
timesharing in Minnesota avoids initial pitfalls.4 Such a response would
LAW. 15 (July-Aug. 1982); Eastman, Tne Share Ownership. A Primer, 57 N.D.L. REV. 151
(1981); see also infia note 9 and accompanying text.
2. See Ingersoll, State Regulation of Thneshanng, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF
TIMESHARING 319, 323 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982).
3. Minneapolis attorney Frederick Rosenblatt noted that unlike conventional con-
dominiums, timeshare interests in Minnesota are, "purely the creation of agreements, in-
variably set forth in recorded instruments. These instruments embody common law
principles and concepts. In the absence of underlying statutory authority, all the appurte-
nant incidents of ownership - alienability, inheritability and rules of governance - are
created, regulated and terminated by private agreement and documentation." Rosen-
blatt, supra note 1, at 26.
4. Minneapolis attorney Frederick Rosenblatt stated that:
Timesharing is a permanent feature on the national and international real estate
landscape. Minnesota, like most states, has not enacted special legislation even
though timesharing presents some unique legal problems. The creative applica-
tion of common law principles to those problems has proven adequate for the
time being, but it is possible that local experience with timesharing will create a
need for legislation. If so, the model acts will provide an excellent starting point.
Any timeshare legislation will have to be carefully tailored, however, to the spe-
cial characteristics of Minnesota timeshare projects.
Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 32; see also Podgers, Two Groups Propose Ttune-Share Legislation,
66 A.B.A.J. 543 (1980) (serious gaps exist nationally between timeshare ownership and
timeshare regulation).
Minnesota State Senator Jack Davies proposed a contrary solution. He introduced
Senate File 482, on February 26, 1981, during the regular session. The bill provided that,
"an estate may not be created that gives an owner a fee interest in real estate for intermit-
tent time periods of less than a year. A conveyance that purports to create an estate that
violates this section shall not be recorded." S.F. 482, summarzed in [1981-1982 Regular
Sessions] MINN. SENATE (PHILLIPS LEGIs. SERV.) 4 (Feb. 26, 1981). The bill did not pass.
Mr. Davies opposes timesharing for several reasons. He indicates particular frustra-
tion with the economic impracticality of timeshare acquisitions by purchasers and great
concern over the ultimate termination of the timeshare interest. Interview with Jack Da-
vies, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law (Feb. 17, 1983).
In 1980, the Minnesota Legislature adopted the 1977 Uniform Condominium Act,
(Uniform Condominium Act, ch. 582, 1980 Minn. Laws 978) (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 515A.1-101 to .4-118 (1982)), but failed to enact Section 4-103 which provided:
(a) For purposes of this section, "time-share estate" means either:
(1) an "interval estate", meaning a combination of (i) an estate for years
in a unit, during the term of which title to the unit rotates among the time-
share owners thereof, vesting in each of them in turn for periods established
by a fixed recorded schedule, with the series thus established recurring regu-
[Vol. 10
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provide timesharing with some credibility,5 as well as providing
timeshare purchasers and developers with a clear framework of their
rights and obligations.
This Note examines the history, functions, and concepts underlying
timesharing. It discusses the legal uncertainties involving timesharing
and successful approaches pursued by other jurisdictions, including re-
cent model legislation. It. also intends to explain the timeshare concept
and its application in Minnesota. Each individual must determine the
possible consequences of purchasing a timeshare interest. As this Note
-arly until the term expires, coupled with (ii) a vested undivided fee simple
"interest in the remainder in that unit, the magnitude of that interest having
been established by declaration or.by the deed creating the interval estate;
or
(2) a "time-span estate,"meaning a combination of (i) an undivided inter-
est in a. -present estate in fee simple in a unit, the magnitude of that interest
having be4p establishedrlby the declaration or by the deed conveying the
time-span estate, coupled with (ii) the exclusive right to possession and oc-
tupancy of that unit during a regularly recurring period designated by that
deed or by a recorded dicument referred to therein.
(b) If the.declration provides that ownership or occupancy of the units are or
may be owned ii time-share , the public offering statement shall disclose in addi-
tion to the informatitn required by Section 4-102:
(1) the total number of units in-which time-share estates may be created;
(2) the total -number of time-share estates that may be created in the
"condominium;
(3) the projected common expense assessment for each time-share estate
and whether those assessments may vary seasonally;
(4) a statement of any services not reflected in the budget which the de-
clarant provides, or experses, which he pays, and which he expects may be-
come at any subsequent time a common expense of the association, and the
projected common expense assessment attributable to each of those services
or expenses for each time-share estate;
(5) the extent to which the time-share owners of a unit are jointly and
severally liable for the payment of real estate taxes and all assessments and
other charges levied against that unit;
(6) the extent to which a suit for partition may be maintained against a
unit owned in time-sharN estates; and
(7) the extent to which a time-share estate may become subject to a tax or
other lien arising out of claims against other time-share owners of the same
unit.
UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT § 4-103, 7 U.L.A. 197 (1977) (amended 1980) [hereinafter
cited as U.C.A.]..
Mr. Davies indicated one reason the legislature did not enact section 4-103 was that,
at the time, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws was pre-
paring a separate uniform timeshare act. Interview with Jack Davies, Professor of Law,
William Mitchell College of Law (Nov. 18, 1982). In 1979, the National Conference of
Commissioners on State Laws promulgated a uniform timeshare act. See infra note 260
and accompanying text.
5. See Davis, The Second-Home Market, Time-Sharing Ownership - Legal and Practical
Problems, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1183, 1192 (1974). But see Timesharing Rules Proposed, Wall
St. J., Sept. 8, 1982, at 31, col. I (industry leader says industry must improve by self-
regulation). See generally Podgers, supra note 4; Comment, Legal Challenges to Time Sharing
Ownership, 45 Mo. L. REv. 423 (1980) (legislation needed to overcome impediments to
acceptance of timesharing).
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concludes, such a determination can best be made within a clear statu-
tory framework.
B. History
Timesharing as a real estate concept6 originated in Europe during the
19 50 's. 7 It first appeared in the United States during the early 1970's, in
a number of resort-dominated states.8 Timeshare ownership has recently
spread to Minnesota.9
Timesharing was created to eliminate the need for resort owners to
search annually for prospective users, 10 providing continuity of users
throughout the years. In 1974, however, timesharing became the pan-
6, Timesharing has been used in contexts other than real estate. Examples of other
uses include boats, planes, and recreational vehicles. See Martin, Time-Sharing in Colorado,
11 COLO. LAW. 2804, 2804 (1982); Penwell, Structuring Fee Time-Sharing Projects, in THE
LEGAL AsPEcTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 57, 67 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And
Practice No. 220, 1982); Fed Up With Dull Vacations? Now You Can Own a ffece of The Yacht,
Mpls. Star & Tribune, Feb. 16, 1983, at 2D, col. 1-3.
7. Ellsworth, Condominiums Are Securities., 2 REAL EST. L.J. 694 (1974); Gunnar, Regu-
lation ofResort Time-Sharing, 57 OR. L. REV. 31, 32 (1977); Hart,A MethodFor Valuing Time-
Share Intervals, 10 REAL EST. REV., Summer 1980, at 107, 108; Pollack, Time-Sharing, or
Tne Is Money But Will It Sell?, 10 REAL EST. L.J. 281, 283 (1982); Rosen, Structure That
Conversion asA Cooperative, 10 REAL EST. REV., Fall 1980, at 35, 35; Rosenblatt, supra note
1, at 15; Smith, Urban Time-Sharng: A Major Growth Area, 12 REAL EST. REV., Summer
1982, at 69, 69; Comment, Tine-Share Condominiums: Property's Fourth Dimension, 32 ME. L.
REV. 181, 181 (1980); Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1288, 1289 (1981); see also Simonett, The Foot-
note as Excursion and Diversion, 55 A.B.A.J. 1141, 1141 n. 1 (1968) (in Ambler-like fashion,
the author describes the string cite, "While it does not pay to beat a dead horse, it is
nevertheless quite an impressive sight to lay out a line of dead horses end to end.").
The Eurotel concept provided that vacationers enter into long term contracts, reserv-
ing space at selected resorts for a given week or weeks each year, over the course of a
number of years. Catalina, Real Estate Time Sharng: Protecting the Buyer, 9 REAL EST. L.J.
144, 144 (1980). The interest is best described as a license to use the particular recrea-
tional facilities during the intervals purchased. Id; see also infra note 34. For a current
analysis of international timesharing, see Ellsworth, Tmesharing Internationally, in THE LE-
GAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 441 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice
No. 220, 1982).
8. See Eastman,supra note 1, at 151; Smith, supra note 7, at 69; Comment, supra note
7, at 181; Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1288, 1289 (1981). For discussions of timesharing develop-
ments in other states, see infra notes 256, 261, 292-97.
9. See Eastman,supra note 1, at 151; Rosenblatt,supra note 1, at 15 (focusing on need
for Minnesota attorneys to familiarize themselves with timesharing because of its increas-
ing use). Currently, timesharing projects exist in six Minnesota resort areas. Telephone
interview with Ingmar Sollin, Research Analyst with the Minnesota Department of Tour-
ism (Oct. 10, 1983).
10. Pollack, supra note 7, at 283. A major limitation on second home sales is the need
for buyers to commit to a repetitive vacation pattern. The commitment is reinforced by
the substantial financial obligation incurred in the purchase and maintenance of the unit.
The financial obligation, repetitive vacation pattern, and the probability of limited per-
sonal use initially restricted the potential market. To broaden the market by reducing the
continuing financial obligation, developers turned to timesharing. Gunnar, supra note 7,
at 31.
[Vol. 10
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss1/8
REGULATING TIMESHARE INTERESTS
acea for the depressed real estate market.II During that time, second
homes were available only to the very wealthy.12 Timesharing became
the vehicle which permitted developers to expand their market to encom-
pass people of lower income levels. 13
C Functions of Timeshare Ownershtp
Timesharing currently serves two functions: it permits developers to
overcome the scarcity of prime resort property,14 and provides more po-
tential purchasers with the ability to obtain a property interest in a sec-
ond home. Therefore, timesharing is more prevalent today than ever
before. 15
During the past decade, the capabilities and attitudes of potential sec-
ond home purchasers have changed. 16 Although they have less disposa-
ble income available for leisure activity, second home purchasers have
more time,17 and a greater demandi8 for leisure activity. Timesharing
11. See Gunnar, supra note 7, at 32. "[I]n the last half of 1974 alone, twelve to fifteen
time-sharing projects came on stream - despite adverse economic, financial, and market
conditions." Ingleby, Tme-Sharing: New Hope for the Second-Home Industry?, 5 REAL EST.
REV., Spring 1975, at 96.
12. Ingleby, supra note 11, at 96. At the time, 30 to 40 percent of resort condominium
purchasers had incomes of over $50,000 a year, while less than one percent of American
households earned that much. Id; see Robbins, The Recreation Condominium, I REAL EST.
REV., Fall 1971, at 5, 7; Comment, New Ideas in the Vacation Home Market, 48 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 1203, 1203 (1974).
13. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 283; Comment, supra note 12, at 1204.
14. Gray, Pioneering the Concept of Time-Shanng Ownership, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1196,
1196 (1974). In part, scarcity is overcome by tapping a new source of buyers. See Ingleby,
supra note 11, at 96-97.
15. Oser, Vacation Plan Offers Options, N.Y. Times, April 11, 1982, § 8, at 1, col. 1. See
generally Podgers, supra note 4; Smith, supra note 7.
One source estimated that at the end of 1981, 600 interval projects with 20,000
timeshare units were operating. The Mortgage and Real Estate Executives Report, Vol. 15, No.
7, June 1, 1982, at 2. Another source has stated that nearly 350,000 families have
purchased timeshares to date. NAT'L L.J., May 10, 1982, at 34. Today, the timesharing
industry has been estimated to generate $1.3 billion a year. Timesharing Rules Proposed,
Wall St. J., Sept. 8, 1982, at 31, col. 1.
16. Before timesharing, vacationers tended to travel long distances. High income,
combined with the mobility and flexibility made possible by improved transportation fa-
cilities, made it feasible for many leisure-oriented people to do as they pleased. See Gray,
supra note 14, at 1196; Comment, supra note 12, at 1203-04.
17. See Malleris, Five Legal Hurdles in Tine-Share OwnershiA 8 REAL EST. REV., Sum-
mer 1978, at 97; Mulligan, The Resort Condominium, I I COLO. LAw. 2799, 2799 (1982);
Varner, Time-Shared Ownership, 12 GA. ST. B.J. 75, 75 (1975).
18. See Clurman, Are Condominium Units Securities?, 2 REAL EST. REV., Spring 1972, at
18; Gray, supra note 14, at 1196. This demand was due in part to the growing mobility of
the general population, which opened up formerly inaccessible recreation areas. Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 182 n.9; Gunnar, supra note 7, at 31; Liebman, Can Condominium
Time-Sharing Work?, 3 REAL EST. REV., Fall 1973, at 40, 41; Roodhouse, Fractional Time-
Period Ownership of Recreational Condominiums, 4 REAL EST. L.J. 35, 36 (1975); see also Com-
ment, supra note 12, at 1203-04.
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harmonizes these conflicting demands by making second homes more
affordable. 19
As potential second home purchasers, residents of Minnesota and
other Midwesterners can benefit from timesharing. 20 Economic condi-
tions have deteriorated in recent years, as evidenced by rising transporta-
tion costs and decreasing amounts of disposable income.2 1 In response,
people have reevaluated the way they spend their leisure time. Since
traditional long-distance vacations are no longer easily affordable, people
either remain at home or travel shorter distances from their homes.
22
Timesharing also benefits developers and resort owners.2 3 There are
19. Timesharing is attractive to purchasers because it enables them to pay only a
fraction of the total purchase price of the unit. For developers, timesharing creates a
larger body of potential purchasers. Varner, supra note 17, at 75.
20. Timesharing programs provide a residential vacation unit in a desirable resort
area at a predetermined initial cost. There is also a measure of control over the annual
vacation cost and a sharing of fixed costs with other users of the unit. See Eastman, supra
note 1, at 153. As one author has suggested:
The primary advantage of time sharing ownership is the low cost of the property
interest purchased. A time-share estate owner also experiences the intangible
satisfaction of owning a place of his own. He need not be concerned with mak-
ing vacation reservations months ahead of time, nor is he subjected to escalating
motel costs. Additional advantages of owning a vacation time-share estate in-
clude interest and real estate tax deductions, equity buildup, and the possibility
of leveraged appreciation leading to a profit upon resale.
Comment, supra note 5, at 427-28; see also Simon & Rugani, Counsehng on Vacation-Property
Time Sharing, 2 CAL. LAW. 51, 51 (1982) (another advantage of timeshare ownership is its
ability to avoid overcrowded accommodations).
Timesharing ownership provides flexibility and mobility. It. offers the advantages of
property ownership generally, such as the ability to sell, rent, donate, or bequeath. See
Pollack, supra note 7, at 281. Timesharing permits flexibility, both horizontally and verti-
cally within the same development, which allows families and friends to purchase units for
the same or consecutive time periods. See Varner, supra note 17, at 77. This flexibility and
mobility may be achieved through a number of exchange programs currently available.
See Hart, supra note 7, at 107; see also Eastman, supra note 1, at 153-54 n. 14; Pollack, supra
note 7, at 289; Varner, supra note 17, at 77. For an analysis of exchange programs, see
Davis, Time-Sharng Networks, 8 REAL EST. REV., Fall 1978, at 42; Langer, Timesharing
Exchange Services, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 265 (P.L.I.
Real Estate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982); Penwell, Exchange Programs, in THE LEGAL
ASPEcTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 279 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice No.
220, 1982). See generally Boster, Marketing the Tme-Share Unit, 5 REAL EST. REv., Spring
1975, at 104, 104-05 (comparing advantages of multiple ownership with timeshare
ownership).
21. See Malleris, supra note 17, at 97; Mulligan, supra note 17, at 2801-02; Comment,
Tne-Sharing." The Needfor Legislation, 50 UMKC L. REV. 302, 318 (1982).
22. One commentator stated: "The ideal recreation zone to accommodate this
changing life-style tends to be approximately one hundred and fifty miles from large ur-
ban centers. This distance enables hurried urbanites to jump into their cars on Friday
afternoon and arrive at the beach or ski slope within four hours." Comment, supra note
12, at 1203; see Comment, supra note 21, at 318. See generaly The Carriers'Kamikaze Attack on
Air Fares, Business Week, Oct. 18, 1982, at 46, col. 3 (long-haul airline ridership has
declined).
23. For developers, one of the assets of timesharing is that it dramatically expands
[Vol. 10
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approximately 1530 resorts in Minnesota.24 Timesharing allows devel-
opers to use the remaining prime recreational real estate available in this
state more effectively. 25 It helps developers overcome rising construction
costs, 26 and provides a greater marginal return on their investments2 7
than a conventional condominium.28
D. The Concept of Timeshare Ownership
The old business adage "time is money"29 applies to timesharing.30
Time is not only applied in a philosophical context, but in a property
one as well - timesharing. Many authors have referred to the division
of property into units of time as property in the "fourth dimension,"31 or
as "condominimizing the condominium."32
their market by reaching out to purchasers of more moderate means. See Yurow, Resort
Condominiums." Rental and Time Sharing Programs- Tax and Securities Problems, 33 INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 1193, 1195 (1975).
Timesharing also allows developers to vary unit prices by season. Units sold for the
most desirable time periods will command higher prices. Varying the unit prices increases
the possibility of a complete sellout of all timeshare units. See Varner, supra note 17, at 77;
see also Ingleby, supra note 11, at 97 (higher occupancy rate generated by timesharing
increases use of other profit centers within resort complex).
24. Telephone interview with Ingmar Sollin, Research Analyst with the Minnesota
Department of Tourism (Oct. 10, 1983). "Minnesota's tourist industry . . . brings about
$2 billion annually to Minnesota's economy, according to the latest figures from the State
Department of Tourism. More than 105,000 people are employed in the industry, with
annual payroll of $735 million." Jones, Long hot summer aids State resorts, Mpls. Star &
Tribune, Sept. 23, 1983, § B, at 5, col. 1.
25. See Gray, supra note 14, at 1196;seealsosupra note 14, infra notes 26-27 and accom-
panying text. See generally Rybak, Even 10,000 lakes may not be enough, Mpls. Star & Trib-
une, July 23, 1983, § S, at 1, col. 1 (increasingly difficult to locate available lakeshore
property to purchase).
26. See Gunnar, supra note 7, at 31; Ingleby, supra note 11, at 96; Liebman, supra note
18, at 40; Comment, supra note 7, at 182-83; Comment, supra note 12, at 1203.
27. Cf. Comment,supra note 5, at 428. "The price markup of a unit sold may be from
15 to 100 percent higher than the selling price of a comparable nontime-sharing unit."
Id; Gray, supra note 14, at 1201 (value of timeshare unit 100 to 125 percent higher than
conventional condominium). See generally Gray, supra note 14, at 1197; Ingleby, supra note
11, at 97 (by subdividing cost of unit ownership into time interests sufficiently priced in
aggregate, developer may easily recoup investment).
28. Throughout this Note, "conventional condominiums" refers to the traditional
method used in condominium developments where a building is subdivided into physical
units, rather than temporal segments.
29. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 281 (citing Franklin, Advice to a Young Tradesman
(1748), reprinted in BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 330b (1955)).
30. The term "timeshare" has been borrowed from the computer industry. See Gray,
supra note 14, at 1197; Pollack, supra note 7, at 281; Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 15; Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 181.
31. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 281; Roodhouse, supra note 18, at 49; Comment,supra
note 7, at 211-13. The fourth dimension, time, is added to the three traditional dimen-
sions of property - breadth, depth, and height.
32. See Comment, supra note 12, at 1216.
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The generic term "timeshare ownership"3 3 describes a variety of meth-
ods developed to facilitate ownership of vacation homes. 34 Timesharing,
in it's most rudimentary terms, is a method whereby a number of persons
own or have the right to use and possess a single piece of property at
different times.3a Specifically, timesharing involves two distinct forms
3 6
- interval estates and time span estates, as well as a third, somewhat
obscure form - fee simple estates.
I. Interval and Time Span Estates
a. Interval Approach
The Uniform Condominium Act (UCA) defines an interval estate as:
[A] combination of (i) an estate for years in a unit, during the term of
which title to a unit rotates among the time-share owners thereof, vest-
ing in each of them in turn for periods established by a fixed recorded
schedule, with the series thus established recurring regularly until the
term expires, coupled with (ii) a vested undivided fee simple interest in
the remainder in that unit, the magnitude of that interest having been
established by the declaration or by the deed creating the interval
estate.
37
The interval method presumes an existing condominium,38 which is then
divided into smaller interests.
39
Under the interval approach, the owner acquires title to the property
for a specified period of time each year4o and a predetermined number of
33. See Eastman, supra note 1, at 152; Comment, supra note 5, at 427.
34. Several forms of timesharing represent nonownership interests. The primary
forms in use today are vacation licenses, vacation leases, and club memberships. For a
detailed explanation of these forms, see Davis, supra note 5, at 1184-85; Gunnar, supra note
7, at 33-34; Pollack, supra note 7, at 285-86; Yurow, supra note 23, at 1196; Comment,supra
note 12, at 1211-15. See generally Davis, Tt~ne-Sharzng Ownership: if/alls and Possibilities, 5
REAL EST. REv., Winter 1976, at 52-53 (advantages of nonownership forms compared
with ownership forms). Recently, the protection provided to timeshare users through the
use of non-disturbance clauses was rejected in In re Sombrero Reef Club, Inc., 18 Bankr.
612 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982). The impact of this decision could be devastating upon non-
ownership timeshare developments. See Martin, supra note 6, at 2806.
35. For an in depth discussion of timesharing, see M. HENZE, THE LAW AND BusI-
NESS OF TIME-SHARE RESORTS (1982); 1 P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW
AND PRACTICE §§ 17C.01-.012 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ROHAN & RESKIN].
36. See also Rosen,supra note 7, at 37-38 (suggesting cooperative form is applicable to
timeshare). But see Davis, supra note 5, at 1183-86 ("There are almost as many methods of
conveying time-shared units as there are developers in the field").
37. U.C.A. § 4-103(a)(1) (1977); see supra note 4.
38. To establish a conventional condominium under the UCA, recording of the dec-
laration or master deed is generally required. U.C.A. § 2-101 (1977). See generally Minne-
sota Uniform Condominium Act (MUCA), MINN. STAT. ch. 515A (1982).
39. Comment, supra note 7, at 201.
40. This period is normally two weeks. Id at 201-02;see Davis, supra note 5, at 1187;
Comment, supra note 5, at 427.
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years. 4 1 This interest is referred to as an estate for years. 42 The owner
also receives a remainder43 in fee simple, which he takes as a tenant in
common with other interval owners.
44
b. T'me Span Approach
The UCA defines a time span estate as:
[A] combination of (i) an undivided interest in a present estate in fee
simple in a unit, the magnitude of that interest having been established
by the declaration or by the deed conveying the time-span estate, cou-
pled with (ii) the exclusive right to possession and occupancy of that
unit during a regularly recurring period designated by that deed or by
a recorded document referred to therein.
4 5
In essence, this method involves a common law tenancy in common,
46
coupled with an agreement between tenants4 7 concerning the time each
has the absolute right to use and possess the property.48 In practice, the
time span method works as follows: a conventional condominium pro-
ject is established49 consisting of the unit itself and an undivided interest
41. The recurring estates for years are usually designed to terminate at the expiration
of the useful life of the condominium project. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1187; Eastman,
supra note 1, at 153 n.1; Gunnar, supra note 7, at 33; Comment, supra note 7, at 201 n.135;
Comment, supra note 5, at 427. At the end of the recurring estates for years, the interval
owners can either reinstate the interval arrangement or seek partition of their interests.
IC ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, at § 17C.01[A]; see also Davis, supra note 5, at 1187
n.13; Eastman, supra note 1, at 153; Comment, supra note 7, at 211 n.135.
42. Comment, supra note 7, at 201; see Varner, supra note 17, at 75. An estate for
years is defined as an estate whose duration is absolutely commutable in units of a year or
multiples or divisions thereof. The estate for years can be a present or future estate. P.
BERGIN & T. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 41
(1966); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 19 comment a (1936).
43. The remainder is used to avoid problems with the Rule against Perpetuities. See
Davis, supra note 5, at 1187; Eastman, supra note 1, at 153 n.l 1; Comment, supra note 5, at
427. The remainder also avoids the treatment of interval property as leased property. See
Comment, supra note 7, at 204-07. The intent of the grantor to convey in fee as opposed to
a lease, if set forth in an instrument of conveyance, should remove doubt as to creation of
a lease. Id. at 203 n.142. See generall I ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, at § 10.0311]
(restraints on alienation); Boyer & Spiegel, Land Use Control" Pre-emptions, Perpetuities and
Similar Restraints, 20 U. MIAMI L. REV. 148, 156-66 (1965) (Rule against Perpetuities).
44. For general discussion and application of the interval estate method, see Davis,
supra note 5, at 1187; Eastman, supra note 1, at 151-52; Martin, supra note 6, at 2805;
Comment, Tinesharing. An Innovative Concept, I Miss. C.L. REV. 439, 440-41 (1980) [herein-
after cited as Comment, Innovative Concept], Comment, supra note 5, at 426-28; Comment,
supra note 12, at 1216-21.
45. U.C.A. § 4-103 (1977); see supra note 4. For discussions of this approach, see Mar-
tin, supra note 6, at 2806; Comment, Innovative Concept, supra note 44, at 441.
46. See Varner, supra note 17, at 75 (state statutes on tenancy in common should be
consulted).
47. See Comment, supra note 7, at 186-87.
48. Varner, supra note 17, at 75; see Comment, supra note 7, at 184-85; Comment,
supra note 5, at 426.
49. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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in areas of common ownership;O a percentage interest in each unit is
then conveyed to the purchasers in fee simple,5I who take as tenants in
common.
c. Comparison of Approaches
Several characteristics distinguish the interval and time span estate ap-
proaches of creating timeshare ownership.5 2 The time span approach
uses a supplemental declaration. The declaration consists of various cov-
enants, conditions, and restrictions entered into by the developer and the
purchaser. The declaration establishes the rights and duties of each ten-
ant in common inler se, including the periods set aside for exclusive
occupancy.
53
Enforcement of supplemental declarations against subsequent pur-
chasers is a problem because courts often refuse to uphold them. 54 Con-
sequently, subsequent purchasers may take free from the impact of the
declaration. Appropriate enabling legislation can eliminate this obsta-
cle 55 and remove the instability of judicial determinations of reasonable-
ness.56 Statutory enforcement of supplemental declarations can improve
50. The areas of common ownership or "common elements" are defined in Minnesota
Statutes section 515A. 1-103(4). MINN. STAT. § 515A. 1-103(4) (1982).
51. Comment, supra note 7, at 185.
52. See Comment, supra note 5, at 426-28.
53. See Comment, supra note 7, at 186.
54. The declaration can be enforced asa covenant running with the land or as an
equitable servitude. Comment, supra note 12, at 1216. For a detailed analysis of these two
methods of enforcement, see Comment, supra note 7, at 191-98.
A covenant running with the land is defined as a. contract respecting the use of land
which is enforceable against successors to the interests of the initial covenantees. See 5 R.
POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 670[2], at 4-5 (1981). To qualify as such, the
declaration must meet four requirements: (1) that the covenant be in deed form; (2) that
the parties intend to create a real covenant; (3) that the covenant touch or concern the
land conveyed; and (4) that there be privity of estate. See Allbright v. Fish, 136 Vt. 387,
394 A.2d 1117 (1978) (court applied these requirements to find a valid covenant existed); 5
R. POWELL, supra, at 1 670-79.
An equitable servitude is defined as "A restriction on the use of land enforceable in
court of equity. It is broader than a covenant running with the land because it is an
interest in land." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 484 (5th ed. 1979). It is based upon the
equitable doctrine of notice. C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS
WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 170 (2d ed. 1947). Therefore, when a subsequent purchaser
takes with notice of a covenant, he is liable to the same extent and in the same manner as
the seller.
There are other problems with the supplemental declaration including destruction of
the unity of possession and waiver of each co-tenant's right to seek judicial partition of the
unit. Comment, supra note 7, at 187-90; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text
(discussing interval estates).
55. The vulnerability of the supplemental declaration to disqualification as a real
covenant or an equitable servitude underscores the need for legislation binding all owners
of a unit held in tenancy in common to the declaration. Comment, supra note 7, at 200.
56. See supra note 55.
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marketability, confirm the interest's value as security for financing pur-
poses, and provide initial purchasers with adequate protection.5
7
In contrast, the interval estate method allows purchasers to take in
fee,58 rather than by declaration. 59 The owner's fee, which is defeasible,
is subject to a shifting executory interest.60 The executory interest passes
the fee to the next timeshare owner when the following time period com-
mences. 6' By taking his interest in fee, the interval estate purchaser be-
comes the sole owner of the unit during his period of occupancy.
62
Furthermore, the interval estate purchaser's right to occupancy arises be-
cause of the ownership interest, rather than the time span supplemental
declaration. 63 Finally, while the time span estate owner may be subject
to another owner's federal tax lien,64 the interval estate method protects
its owners from federal tax liens resulting from another owner's
deficiency.6
5
2. Fee Simple Estate
The fee simple estate is an unconventional and seldom used timeshare
method. 66 This method conveys a fee simple estate to each purchaser.
67
57. Id
58. See generally IC ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, at § 17C.01[A]; Davis, supra note
5, at 1187.
59. See Comment, supra note 7, at 202. With interval ownership, possessory rights are
established in the deed and not by the interval declaration. Comment,supra note 5, at 202
n. 138.
60. A shifting executory interest is a real property interest which shifts title from one
transferee to another. A fee simple subject to a shifting executory interest is an estate,
whereupon the happening of an event specified in the instrument, the fee simple is auto-
matically transferred to a third person, and not to the original grantor or the grantor's
heirs. See 5 R. POWELL, supra note 54, at 1 779[3].
61. Comment, supra note 5, at 427.
62. See id The time span purchaser, on the other hand, shares ownership with other
tenants in common, having only the exclusive right of use during his allotted period. See
id. at 426.
63. See supra note 59.
64. See Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 31; see also in~fra note 225 (time span owners subject
to others' tax liens).
65. See supra note 64.
66. See Comment, supra note 7, at 211 n.186. The author states:
The fee simple method appears to be a theoretical rather than actual method of
creating time-share interests. There is very little discussion of this method of
time-sharing in the topical literature. Fee simple is mentioned as a possible alter-
native method of creating time-share interests in Outen, but the author does not
specify the extent to which this method is actually used. Fee simple is also dis-
cussed as a theoretical possibility in Roodhouse.
Id (citations omitted). The fee simple method was recognized by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in promulgating the Uniform Real Estate
Time-Share Act (URETSA) in 1979. One year later, the Commissioners reconsidered
their action and concluded that the uniform act should be promulgated as a model act for
practical reasons. See MODEL REAL ESTATE TIME-SHARE AcT, Commissioner's Prefatory
Note, 7A U.L.A. 259 (Supp. 1983) [hereinafter cited as MRETSA]. MRETSA includes a
19841
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As with the interval and time span approaches, it presumes an existing
conventional condominium which is then divided into timeshare inter-
ests.68 The developer conveys these interests to the purchasers in fee sim-
ple absolute. 69 In addition, a declaration is executed establishing the
rights and duties of the new owners.
70
The fee simple approach is recognized by statute only in Utah7 ' and
has several drawbacks. 72 It ignores traditional common law principles of
estates in land. 73 The estate or interest conveyed is time, rather than a
conventional property interest. 74 The fee simple approach differs from
the interval and time span approaches because the purchaser is not a
joint owner of the property.
75
II. TIMESHARING'S PERPLEXITIES
Timesharing is not without its problems and legal uncertainties.76 Ap-
relevant section providing for the fee simple method. Id. § 1-103(a); see infra note 270 and
accompanying text.
67. See Burek, Uniform Real Estate Time Share Act, 14 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 683,
684 (1979); Comment, supra note 7, at 211.
68. See supra notes 38, 49 and accompanying text. In order to timeshare a condomin-
ium, one must establish a condominium from which time interests can be shared. Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 211 n.187.
69. See Burek, supra note 67, at 684; Comment, supra note 7, at 684.
70. Burek, supra note 67, at 685-86.
71. UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-6 (Supp. 1981). Section 57-8-6 provides in relevant
part:
The owner of a time period condominium unit shall be entitled to the exclusive
ownership and possession of the physical unit to which his time period relates
and shall be entitled to the use and enjoyment of the common areas and facilities
during, but only during, such annually recurring part or parts of a year as de-
scribed and define the time period unit concerned in the declaration.
Id
72. See Comment, supra note 7, at 211.
73. See id.; Burek, supra note 67, at 684.
74. Time is the "fourth dimension" of property. See supra note 31. The conventional
dimensions of property are breadth, depth, and height. See id. See general' Comment,
supra note 7, at 211-17 (explanation of effect this unconventional interest has on tradi-
tional concepts of estates).
75. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-6 (Supp. 1981); Burek, supra note 67, at 684; Com-
ment, supra note 7, at 211.
76. See Trouble-Free Condominium Living?, Wall St. J., November 28, 1978, reprinted in
Ellsworth & Prendergast, Securities Maze Awaits Resort Time-Share Offerings, 10 REAL EST.
REV., Spring 1980, at 59, 64. The article states:
Since 1975, lawsuits involving Florida condominium owners have tripled, ac-
cording to lawyers who have surveyed court filings. The state's legislature has
amended the condominium statutes nearly every two years. And 85% of all Flor-
ida appellate decisions in condominium law, which set legal precedent, have
been written since 1976. . . . In some Florida condominiums, feelings run dan-
gerously high. Unit owners bring their own lawyers and even court reporters to
meetings, which often are attended by armed guards and rescue units because
they are punctuated with fistfights, screaming matches and occasional heart
attacks.
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propriate legislation, however, can reconcile and ameliorate many of
these concerns. 77 Further inquiry into these issues should demonstrate
the ability of comprehensive legislation to resolve them.
A. Securities
In planning a timeshare development, developers 78 must be aware
that the sale of units may be construed as a sale of securities.
79 If
timeshare interests are considered securities, various federalO and state8'
securities laws and regulations may apply.8 2 These laws will impose re-
gistration procedures, anti-fraud provisions, and licensing requirements
on timeshare developers,83 unless an exemption is available.84
Id
77. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
78. For purposes of this securities analysis, the term "developers" includes promoters
as well.
79. See Ellsworth, supra note 7, at 694; Pollack, supra note 7, at 292; Comment, supra
note 12, at 1206.
80. See Securities Act of 1933 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1976 & Supp. V
1981)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)).
81. See Act of May 21, 1973, ch. 451, 1973 Minn. Laws 986 (codified at MINN. STAT.
ch. 80A (1982)). For a general description of the securities statutes, see Lewis, A New and
Comprehensive Fom of Sceurities Regulation in Minnesota, 42 HENN. LAw. 6, 10 (Nov.-Dec.
1973).
Discussion of relevant federal developments should provide adequate insight into ap-
plication of the issue in Minnesota. Minnesota Statutes section 80A.31 provides that,
"Sections 80A.01 to 80A.31 shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate the interpretation of
sections 80A.0/ to 80,4.31 with related federal regulation." Minn. Stat. § 80A.31 (1982) (em-
phasis added).
82. Malleris, supra note 17, at 100; Pohoryles, Time-Sharing. How To Do It, 6 REAL
EST. REV., Fall 1976, at 23, 24 ; see Yurow, supra note 23, at 1219. See generally 3 H.
BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAw §§ 2.15, 2.19[5] (rev. ed.
1983).
83. See Yurow, supra note 23, at 1219. The costs involved in registering securities can
be considerable. As one author has stated:
The largest single expense in registering securities for public sale is usually the
underwriters' compensation, which generally ranges from seven to ten percent of
the offering price; the rest of the costs are more or less fixed. Legal fees are
generally between $40,000 and $75,000. Accounting expenses vary widely but, if
there were no prior audits, fees of $35,000 to $55,000 are not unusual. Printing
expenses can also vary widely but typically are between $25,000 and $75,000.
Thus, for a first public offering, total expenses in the $200,000 range would be
typical. Schneider & Manko, Going Public - Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 15
VILL. L. REV. 283, 298-300 (1970). The $200,000 figure does not include such
miscellaneous expenses as the SEC registration fee, insurance premiums (for
protection against Securities Act liabilities), state filing fees (in each state where
securities are sold) and stock certificates. In addition, the average first public
offering normally requires two to three months of intensive work before the regis-
tration statement can be filed, followed by a waiting period of anywhere from
two weeks to 100 days (depending upon the number of other recently filed regis-
tration statements) for SEC review and comment. If it needs to be amended, the
19841
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Although the sale of real estate, per se, is not a security within the
meaning of the Securities Act of 1933,85 "when condominium units are
offered in conjunction with certain collateral arrangements a security
may be involved."8
6
In SEC v., W.J. Howey Co.,87 the United States Supreme Court con-
strued the interest conveyed in a land sales contract coupled with a serv-
ice contract as an "investment contract,"88 within the definition of a
"security."89 The Court held that an investment contract is "a contract,
final effective date of the registration statement may be six months or more after
the preparation was begun. Id. at 296-300.
Comment, Reinterpreting the "Section 4(1-1/2) " Exemption From Securities Registration. The In-
vestor Protection Requirement, 16 U.S.F.L. REV. 681, 684 n.19 (1982).
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (Supp. V 1981); MINN. STAT. § 80A. 15 (1982). None of these
exemptions have been held to apply. California specifically exempts timeshare sales from
the definition of securities under Corporate Code section 25100(0 of the California Corpo-
rate Securities Law of 1968. CAL. [CORP.] CODE § 25100 (West 1980); see Simon &
Rugani, supra note 20, at 52.
85. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (Supp. V 1981); Clurman,supra note 18, at 21 (dis-
tinguishing condominium as residence versus security); Varner, supra note 17, at 78; Com-
ment, supra note 12, at 1205. For an analysis of why real estate is not a security, see
Rhoads, California Real Estate Brokers Deal in Securities, 11 REAL EST. L.J. 178 (1982).
86. Yurow, supra note 23, at 1219-20; see Comment, supra note 7, at 182 n. 1l. See
generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1288, 1289 n.1 (1981) (timeshares have attracted SEC
attention).
87. 328 U.S. 293, reh'gdenied, 329 U.S. 819 (1946); see also SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing
Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943) (sales of oil leases were securities transactions under definition
of investment contract).
88. Howe; involved an offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled with a
management contract to cultivate and market the produce for the investors. The Court
permitted the SEC to enjoin the promoters from using the mails and instrumentalities of
interstate commerce in the offer of these unregistered and non-exempt securities because
this was a violation of the Securities Act of 1933. Howe, 328 U.S. at 300.
89. The Securities Act of 1933 provides that:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit
for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights,
...or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security,"
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate
for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any
of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added). The Minnesota Securities Act de-
fines a security as:
any note; stock; treasury stock; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; certif-
icate of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement; collateral trust
certificate; preorganization certificate or subscription; transferable shares; invest-
ment contract,, investment metal contract or investment gem contract; voting trust
certificate; certificate of deposit for a security; certificate of interest or participa-
tion in an oil, gas or mining right, title or lease...; or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as a security, or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. "Security"
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transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the pro-
moter or a third party. ... "90 Following Howey, the SEC construed the
definition of investment contracts to include offerings of resort condo-
miniums pursuant to the Securities Act of 193391 and the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.92
In 1973, the SEC issued Release No. 534793 which stated that condo-
minium offerings, coupled with any of several collateral arrangements,
would be viewed as an offering of securities. 94 The SEC then issued a
number of "no action" letters, narrowing the scope of the Release. 95 In
1974, the SEC retreated from their previous position, announcing that
they would no longer issue "no action" letters on condominium
offerings. 96
does not include any insurance or endowment policy or annuity contract under
which an insurance company promises to pay money either in a lump sum or
periodically for life or for some other specified period.
MINN. STAT. § 80A. 14(18) (1982) (emphasis added).
90. 328 U.S. at 298-99.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (Supp. V 1981).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(10) (Supp. V 1981). Specifically, the SEC informed a developer
that the offer and sale of condominiums, combined with a rental option, was an offer and
sale of a security. The SEC therefore obtained its first registration statement covering this
type of offering. Comment, Condominium Regulation: Beyond Disclosure, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
639, 652 n.67 (1975) (citing Hale Kaanapali Apartment Hotel Development Co., Regis-
tration Statement No. 2-25489 (Apr. 13, 1967)).
93. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5347, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc.'L.
REP. (CCH) 79,163 (Jan. 4, 1973), reprinted in Penwell, Structuring Fee Timesharing Projects,
in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 57, 195-98 (P.L.I. Real Estate
Law And Practice No. 220, 1982).
94. The Release indicated that the SEC considered any of the following collateral
arrangements offered in conjunction with the sale of condominium units as an offering of
securities. These collateral arrangements include: (1) participation in a rental pool;
(2) reference to potential economic benefits derived from efforts of developer or third
party; and (3) mandatory rental arrangement where an exclusive agent is required. For
an analysis of Release No. 5347, see Ellsworth & Prendergast, supra note 76, at 60; Gunnar,
supra note 7, at 37; Pollack, supra note 7, at 293-94; Yurow, supra note 23, at 1221-22;
Comment, supra note 12, at 1206-07.
95. Ellsworth & Prendergast, supra note 76, at 60; Gunnar, supra note 7, at 37. For
examples of the "no action" letters, see SEC No-Action Letter, Sunriver Properties, Inc.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,691 (Dec. 11, 1973); SEC No-
Action Letter, Tahoe Donner Ski Bowl Condominiums, [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 79,440 (July 18, 1973); SEC No-Action Letter, The Innisfree Corp.,
[1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79,398 (April 5, 1973).
96. Ellsworth & Prendergast, supra note 76, at 60; Gunnar, supra note 7, at 38. The
specific language was:
While no-action letters are limited to the facts presented and, even as to these, do
not represent an interpretation of the law, the Commission is, nevertheless, con-
cerned that inferences may be drawn from the issuance of no-action letters in this
rapidly evolving area. Such inferences could lead to misunderstandings as to the
Commission's position, and to contentions in future situations that the Commis-
sion had taken a position which it had not, in fact, taken. Consequently, the
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One year later, the United States Supreme Court, in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 97 held that although the purchaser may have
been motivated by the potential for profit at resale, the purchase of stock
in a housing corporation was not a security.98 The key to Forman was
that the buyer had entered into the arrangement to consume the
property. 9 9
When a buyer purchases a timeshare unit for personal residential use,
it is not a security.100 Since timesharing units are offered and purchased
primarily for personal recreational reasons, they should not be classified
as securities.11 Classification of a timeshare offering as a sale of securi-
ties may be avoided by taking a few simple precautions.10 2 These meas-
ures include: (1) eliminating any guarantee of profit upon resale;103
(2) avoiding any rental arrangements;10 4 and (3) requiring that units be
owner-occupied when purchased.1o 5 Nevertheless, "every offeror should
seek qualified advice at an early stage of project evolution to determine
whether securities problems exist, and if so whether it is possible to struc-
Commission has directed its staff not to issue no-action letters in this area, and to
advise that no-action letters issued in the past in this general field do not extend
beyond the particular issues involved and should not be relied upon by any other
person or by the persons receiving prior letters for any other offerings.
SEC No-Action Letter, In re Tropics International, 252 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) C-I
(May 6, 1974), reprited in Gunnar, supra note 7, at 38 n.36.
97. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
98. Id. at 858.
99. Pollack, supra note 7, at 293.
100. See id at 294.
101. See Fleming & Keane, Securities Imphcattons of Tine Share Condominium Offerings- A
Fresh Look, 55 FLA. B.J. 467, 471-72 (1981); Pollack, supra note 7, at 294; Yurow,supra note
23, at 1224. Contra Comment, supra note 5, at 440 n.86 (sale of timeshare estates may be
classified as sale of securities) (citing Byrne, Securities Regulation of Time-Sharing Resort Condo-
miniumns, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 3 (1978)). For discussions of the effect of securities regulation
on resort condominiums, see Clurman, Condominiums as Securities: A Current Look, 19
N.Y.L.F. 457 (1974); Note, Federal Securities Regulation of Condominiums: A Purchaser's Perspec-
tive, 62 GEO. L.J. 1403 (1974); Comment, Looking Through Form to Substance. Are Montana
Resort Condominiums "Securi'ties"', 35 MONT. L. REV. 265 (1974); Note, Securities.- Another
Way to Regulate the Resort Development Boom, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 104 (1974); Note, Shares of a
State-Subsidized Non-Profit Cooperative Housing Corporation Are Securities Under Federal Securities
Law, 53 TEx. L. REV. 623 (1975).
102. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 294; Varner, supra note 17, at 78. See generaly Byrne,
supra note 101, at 3 (analysis of the tools developers use to avoid securities regulation).
103. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 294. See generally Comment, supra note 12, at 1209-10
(guaranteed profits to purchaser will bring about SEC enforcement).
104. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 294; Yurow, supra note 23, at 1223. See generally Com-
ment, supra note 12, at 1206 (rental pools will trigger SEC scrutiny).
105. These precautionary measures can easily be implied from SEC Release No. 5347.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text. One author has suggested a restriction upon
purchasers, forbidding or limiting transfer of the unit. See Byrne, supra note 101, at 8-9.
One may begin to wonder how deep the fear of SEC involvement runs in the hearts of
developers.
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ture the offering so as to avoid such problems."1o6
B. Restrictions on Conversion to Timesharing
As timesharing becomes more prevalent, existing condominiums may
be converted to timeshare units.107 Partial conversion of a condominium
complex, particularly if many of its present owners use their units as per-
manent residences, may disrupt the quiet enjoyment of their property. 108
In Laguna Royale Owners Association v. Darger, 109 a California court recently
addressed the issue of whether a condominium association could restrain
a timeshare conversion. The court held the association could not pro-
hibit conversion of a single condominium unit into a timeshare estate.110
The Darger court found that the association could not reasonably restrain
the creation of multiple ownership of undivided interests, stating:
[M]ultiple ownership has no necessary connection to intensive use.
Twenty, yea, a hundred persons could own undivided interests in a
condominium for investment purposes and lease the condominium on
a long-term basis to a single occupant whose use of the premises would
probably be less intense in every respect than that considered "normal
and usual."'"I
Darger indicates that, absent specific legislation, condominium associa-
tions may be unable to prevent conversions of existing units into
106. Ellsworth & Prendergast, supra note 76, at 64; see Varner, supra note 17, at 78.
107. See Comment, Proposed Legislation for Property's Twilight Zone- Time Sharing in Geor-
gia, 34 MERCER L. REV. 403, 410 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Twilight Zone!;
Comment, Timesharing.- A Unique Property Concept Creates The Needfor Comprehensive Legisla-
tion, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 629, 650 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Unique Property/.
108. See infra note 110.
109. 119 Cal. App. 3d 670, 174 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1981). For an analysis of Darger and its
potential impact on timesharing, see August, Clockwork Condo. The Timesharing Condominium
Stumbles Into Court, 11 REAL EsT. L.J. 203 (1983).
110. Darger, 119 Cal. App. 3d at 688, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 147. In Darger, the owners of
one condominium unit assigned part of their interests to three other couples on a timeshar-
ing basis. Id. at 678, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 141. The other condominium owners in the com-
plex attempted to prevent the assigning owners from engaging in the timeshare scheme.
Id at 677-78, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 141.
Although the majority held the timeshare conversion permissible, Justice Gardner
dissented, stating:
The use of a unit on a time sharing basis is inconsistent with the quiet enjoyment
of the premises by the other occupants. Time sharing is a remarkable gimmick.
P.T. Barnum would have loved it. It ordinarily brings enormous profits to the
seller and in this case would bring chaos to the other residents. Here we have
only four occupants but if this transfer is permitted there is nothing to stop a
more greedy occupant of a unit from conveying to 52 or 365 other occupants.
If as an occupant of a condominium I must anticipate that imy neighbors
are going to change with clocklike regularity, I might just as well move into a
hotel - and get room service.
Id at 689, 174 Cal. Rptr at 148.
111. Id at 685, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
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timeshare interests.12 Minnesota needs legislation that will permit as-
sociations to protect an owner's quiet enjoyment of his property by
prohibiting timeshare conversions of less than all the units in a
condominium.
C Marketing and Sales
Developers should consider the effects of timesharing on the marketing
and sales of their units. As the foregoing securities analysis revealed, de-
velopers must refrain from holding out units as investments and insinuat-
ing that a potential for profit exists in order to avoid the cost of securities
registration.1 3 A developer should market his product solely on the ba-
sis of its consumer use benefits.' 14
To insure zealous and effective advocacy of timesharing's consumer
use benefits, developers should design a marketing strategy." 5 They
should carefully consider unit composition and design,1 6 and exercise
care in selecting a site.17 The site should reflect both proximity and
accessibilityl8 to the market. To identify a class of potential purchasers,
developers may study market profiles.1 9 They should consider the
length and types of seasons available,120 as well as the availability of nat-
ural physical amenities.
Timeshare projects result in more sales at an average higher profit
112. See Comment, Unique Propery, supra note 107 at 634-35 (discussing another
timesharing conversion case, Homeowners Ass'n v. Big Canoe Corp., No. C-65248 (Ga.
Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 1980)). See generally August, supra note 109, at 207-08 (converting ex-
isting condominiums into timeshare units raises mixed use considerations). For a thor-
ough analysis of mixed use considerations, see Lundquist, Mixed Use Condominiums Under the
Minnesota Uniform Condomnznium Act, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. - (1984).
113. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also Davis,supra note 5, at 1190-91;
Varner, supra note 17, at 109.
114. See Boster, supra note 20, at 106-07; Comment, Regulating Vacation Thnesharing: A
More Effective Approach, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 907, 919 (1982).
115. See Boster, supra note 20, at 105; Davis, supra note 5, at 1190.
116. See Boster, supra note 20, at 106 (design should be comparable to hotels).
117. See Boster, supra note 20, at 105; Varner, supra note 17, at 109.
118. Varner, supra note 17, at 109.
119. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1191-92. Davis discussed a market profile completed by
the Interval Corporation which revealed that the average buyer was in his late thirties to
early forties, well educated, and interested in cash sales. Id, see also Comment, Innovative
Concept, supra note 44, at 439 (most timeshare purchasers have families).
120. See Boster, supra note 20, at 105-06; Varner, supra note 17, at 109. One author has
suggested that the best season for timesharing is the year-round season, such as is found in
tropical or arid states. Davis, supra note 5, at 1190.
Types of seasons go hand in hand with the pricing of each share. Each season should
have its own timeshare composition and price because the unit owner is, in essence,
purchasing the use rather than the unit. Furthermore, differential pricing can be used to
solve the problem of selling less desirable off-season shares. Many projects have failed
because of attempts to force owners to take less desirable shares when seeking to purchase
more desirable ones. Boster, supra note 20, at 106.
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than do traditional condominium projects. 12i In turn, brokers' and
agents' median sales commissions are decreased, thus increasing the de-
veloper's fixed costs.122 The developer can offset these costs with an "on
site" sales program. 23 The price of each timeshare unit will reflect the
increased sales expenses and the additional costs of mass marketing
24
and unit furnishings. 25 In formulating a sales strategy, developers must
consider the special features of timesharing.
The unique nature of timesharing is the greatest hurdle developers
must overcome in marketing this product. ' 2 6 Before reaching the merits
of particular projects, marketing strategies and sales techniques should
initially focus on educating the public on the concept of timesharing. 127
Legislation can facilitate this educational process by making timesharing
a subject of public debate.
2 8
D. Fnancing
The availability of financing for developers and timeshare owners is
uncertain. Innovative lending practices would help to promote the
growth and development of timesharing. 2 9 Since lenders hesitate to
121. Although timeshare sales cost much more than ordinary condominium unit sales,
the developer can increase his profits by fractionalizing the units and marking up each
unit above the whole unit cost. The aggregate of the timeshares in a unit, when sold, may
amount to a price two and a half to three times more than it would have been had it been
sold as a single unit to a single buyer. Pollack, supra note 7, at 287; see also Boster, supra
note 20, at 107 (developers have generally marked timeshare prices up 25 to 50% over
whole unit prices).
122. Boster, supra note 20, at 107; see Pollack, supra note 7, at 287.
123. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1190-91. The cost of educating sales persons to the
concept of timesharing also raises the developer's fixed costs. Pollack, supra note 7, at 287.
124. See Boster, supra note 20, at 107.
125. Pollack, supra note 7, at 288. The resulting inflated purchase price does not seem
to deter buyers. See Boster, supra note 20, at 107. Thomas J. Davis, Jr. offered a rationale
for the purchasers' acceptance of this markup:
The analogy is to a man desiring two eggs with no place to store any he does not
use. Would he be best advised to buy a dozen for a dollar, or two for fifteen
cents each? If his need is for only two, buying the dozen would cost him an
average of fifty cents a piece for the two he used since he would waste the rest.
Even though the per unit price of the eggs bought individually is higher, they are
clearly the best buy for his purposes. Such is the case in time sharing. The buyer
buys only what he needs, paying the developer a premium for the additional
effort involved.
Davis, supra note 5, at 1191.
126. See Varner, supra note 17, at 109.
127. See id'.; see also Davis, supra note 5, at 1192; Pollack, supra note 7, at 287 (discussing
need for public information regarding timesharing).
128. See Comment, supra note 5, at 439-41 (usefulness of legislation).
129. See Boster, supra note 20, at 107-08. "Indications are that once the time-sharing
concept is understood and the project and shares properly appraised, lenders will judge a
timesharing development just as any other - on the basis of project quality, feasibility,
marketability, and developer strength." Id at 108.
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finance these projects primarily because of their novelty,130 comprehen-
sive timeshare legislation can have tremendous impact in the area of
financing. Legislative enactment of a comprehensive statutory frame-
work governing timesharing would encourage lending institutions to
finance this concept of second home ownership,13 1 and reassure them
that timeshare projects are not necessarily high risk investments.1
32
I. Construction Loans
Until timesharing becomes more common in Minnesota, lenders will
not have performance records from which to gauge their financing deci-
sions. Consequently, developers will have to be creative in their financ-
ing proposals. Their proposals should include a plan for an alternative
use of the project, such as an apartment complex or a traditional condo-
minium project.133 The plan may employ one of two methods of alterna-
tive financing - the "phase in" method or the "release" method.
130. Varner, supra note 17, at 78; see also Boster, supra note 20, at 107; Davis, supra note
5, at 1187; Thomas, The Permanent Lender's Role in a Condominium Project, 1982 A.L.I. - A.B.A.
Course on Real Est. Condo. and Planned Unit Deve. 267, 269-70; Comment, supra note 21, at
313 (lenders hesitant to finance timesharing projects).
Lenders, whether they are "innovative" or not, base their decisions on their ability to
measure the prospective risk involved. Two tools they use to measure this risk are the
loan-to-value ratio in the proposed mortgage and previous foreclosure experience with
similar mortgaged property. See E. FIEDLER, MEASURES OF CREDIT RISK AND EXPERI-
ENCE 10 (1971). Timesharing provides lenders with little, if any, experience from which to
determine the amount of risk involved.
131. See Varner, supra note 17, at 78.
132. Ste Comment, supra note 5, at 440 n.85 (citing Roodhouse, supra note 18, at 40).
A careful examination of the general underwriting of the condominium documents
should reassure lending institutions. One author has suggested a checklist that lenders
may follow. This checklist includes: (1) the length of the developer's control period;
(2) the rights retained by the developer; (3) maintenance arrangements; (4) a guarantee
that the developer will complete the project; (5) warranties of units and common elements;
(6) restraints on alienation; (7) a proposed operating budget; (8) the adequacy of insur-
ance; and (9) marketing scheme. Thomas, supra note 130, at 272-76. For an analysis of
loan underwriting of timeshare projects, see Bilbray, Legal Aspects of Real Estate Tnesharing
Right To Use Structures and Club Membership, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE
TIMESHARING 211, 227-34 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982).
133. See Varner, supra note 17, at 78. Thomas Davis, Jr. set forth the rationale under-
lying this practice, stating:
[T]he construction loan on a time-sharing development can be compared to
many other developments. Generally, a time-sharing development looks like
something else. It looks like a hotel or a condominium project or a detached
housing resort develpment. Financing will be structured as some percentage of
total projected sellout. Due to the newness of time-sharing and the uncertainty
in lenders' minds as to the potential market, an alternate use for the project
should be determined in the event the time-sharing marketing effort fails. If
there is no convertibility factor, the lender could end up with a very unhappy
situation.
Davis, supra note 5, at 1187 (emphasis added).
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a. Phase In Method
Developers have used the phase in method successfully to solicit
financing in new markets. 134 Under the phase in method, the developer
provides that all sales will be conditional until a designated percentage of
the development is sold within a given time period. Once the developer
sells this percentage of units, the conditional sales become final and fu-
ture sales are unconditional. If the developer fails to obtain the necessary
percentage of sales within the prescribed time, he must convert the pro-
ject to the proposed alternative use.'
35
b. Release Method
The release method also involves the alternative use theory. Although
it has rarely been used, the release method is feasible.' 36 Under this
method, the developer offers a diversified project 13 7 in which a limited
number of units are conditionally designated for timeshare sales. If the
market adequately proves itself, clear title is conveyed to the purchasers
by obtaining releases of the timeshare units from the lien of the blanket
mortgage. '
38
134. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1188; Martin, supra note 6, at 2805. This approach is
cautious to the extent that the developer reduces the number of units committed to
timeshare before determining the market's receptivity to the concept. See Ingleby, supra
note 11, at 102; Martin, upra note 6, at 2805. For a successful example of this method, see
I ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, at § 17C.02[l] ("phase in" method used by Innisfree
Corporation in Brockway Springs project).
135. See Ingleby,supra note 11, at 102; Martin,supra note 6, at 2805. Ingleby, however,
raised a significant concern. He stated that a "developer [using this method] could well
face serious problems from disgruntled purchasers. A change of the rules of the game in
midstream always raises the specter of lawsuits and rescissions by unhappy buyers." In-
gleby, supra note 11, at 102. These problems are alleviated by incorporating the proce-
dures of the purchase into the instrument and providing an escrow account for deposit of
purchase money. See 'nzfra note 140 and accompanying text.
136. See Davis, spra note 5, at 1188. Davis suggested that:
A very crucial part of the loan package will be the provisions for release of the
units from the construction or other underlying mortgages. Ideally, the lender
will release on a per time period basis. A more conservative lender will release
on a per unit basis, an arrangement which can be worked with but which takes
considerably more planning.
Id For a general discussion of the release method, see Martin, supra note 6, at 2807.
137. A diversified project is a development that includes forms of recreational housing
other than timeshare units. These forms may include hotel arrangements or conventional
condominiums.
138. Eastman, supra note 1, at 161. Eastman noted that:
When an entire project is subject to a lien of blanket mortgage, the lender nor-
mally will require full payment of the portion of the mortgage attributable
before it will issue partial releases for the individual apartment units. The same
practice does not apply however, in the sale of a time unit (which is less than the
ownership of the entire interest) in that apartment.
Id But see Varner, supra note 17, at 78. Mr. Varner pointed out that, "such a method
complicates the wording of the release provisions since the projected time-sharing sales
price is normally a multiple of the nontime-sharing sales price. Consequently, release pro-
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Lenders should be willing to finance timeshare projects that use one of
these methods. The phase in and release methods permit lenders to view
the property interest in conventional terms.139 Should default occur, the
lender can foreclose on physical units, rather than diverse time periods in
a number of units. Furthermore, purchasers are adequately protected
from losing their equity since they pay their purchase money into escrow
until clear title is conveyed.l 40
2. End Loans
End loans, which are loans made to ultimate purchasers, are difficult
to obtain because of the uncertainties of timesharing. In a timeshare
unit, the security interest upon foreclosure is the time period itself.141
Only one proven method currently exists to overcome the lender's reluc-
tance to accept this interest. This method involves a conventional surety-
ship relationship 42 in which two persons are liable for the mortgage debt
- the timeshare owner and the project developer.143 The developer acts
visions and similar items cannot be based in any standardized manner on loan ratios." Id
at 78, 109. Mr. Varner gave the following example demonstrating his objection:
[I]f the projected nontime-sharing sales price is $40,000 for 5 physical units, or
$200,000, and assuming the loan ratio is 80% or $160,000 and the usual release
criterion used by the lender is 125% of the loan, the amount needed to release
one physical unit would be $40,000 (1/5 80% of $200,000 = $32,000 x 125% =
$40,000). If the projected time unit sales price is $4,000 for a two-week period
per year for the usable life of the facility, the average down payment, 25% and
the goal is to sell 25 time units per year per physical unit, a complete sell out of
one physical unit would not be sufficient to release that unit. (25% x $4,000 x 25
units = $25,000).
Id at 110 n.15.
139. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. See generall Varner, supra note 17, at
78 (financing the development).
140. See Tmesharng Rules Proposed, supra note 5. Deposits of money into escrow in real
estate transactions in Minnesota can fall within the scope of two statutes. The first, Min-
nesota Statutes section 515A.4-108, provides that:
Any earnest money paid in connection with the purchase or reservation of a unit
from a declarant shall be escrowed and held in this state in an account, savings
deposit or certificate of deposit designated solely for that purpose in an institu-
tion whose accounts are insured by a governmental agency or instrumentality
until (1) delivered to the declarant at closing; (2) delivered to the declarant be-
cause of purchaser's default under the purchase agreement or reservation; or
(3) delivered to the purchaser.
MINN. STAT. § 515A.4-108 (1982). The second, Minnesota Statutes section 82.24, entitled
Trust Account Requirements, pertains to brokers and salespersons of real estate. It requires
stricter scrutiny of escrow accounts than section 515A.4-108. See id. § 82.24. Section 82.24
also permits trust accounts that maintain interest bearing funds. See id § 82.24, subd. 7.
141. See Boster, supra note 20, at 107.
142. See id See generally A. STEARNS, LAW OF SURETYSHIP (5th ed. 1951) [hereinafter
cited as STEARNS]. Other methods to secure end loans do exist. See generally Financing Real
Estate During the Inftationay 80's, 1981 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. LAW. These
methods, however, involve forms of security other than the timeshare interest and are
outside the scope of this Note.
143. See STEARNS, supra note 142, § 11.8, at 459.
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as the personal surety, 144 guaranteeing the timeshare owner's debt to the
lender. Should the timeshare owner default rather than foreclose, the
lender can compel the developer to repurchase the defaulted interest. 145
The concern over the availability of end loan financing may be unwar-
ranted. Timeshare interests are relatively inexpensive.146 Many pur-
chasers may choose to acquire their interests outright, rather than
financing them. 147 If some form of financing is desired, the term of the
arrangement should be relatively short, 148 reasonably, no longer than
five years. 149 Comprehensive timeshare legislation would eliminate the
need for many of these creative financing approaches by defining the
nature of the security interest and helping to ensure project stability.
150
144. Personal surety is defined as "[t]he engagement of a person to be answerable for
the debt, default or miscarriage of another." Id. § 1.3, at 2.
145. For an analysis of options available to a mortgagee in enforcing a guaranty, see
MINNESOTA BANKERS Ass'N, REAL ESTATE LENDING PROCEDURES AND FORMS MAN-
UAL 11-7 (1982). These options are: (1) foreclose the mortgage by advertisement and
commence a separate action against the guarantor for any deficiency; (2) foreclose the
mortgage by action and name the guarantor in the same lawsuit; and (3) sue the
guarantors first and obtain a judgment against them, foreclosing upon the property only if
the judgment is unsatisfied. Id
146. Costs can range from $2,000 to $10,000 per share. Boster, supra note 20, at 105.
147. For a different perspective, see Ingleby, supra note I1, at 102. He stated:
Some financing arrangement is essential in most time-sharing developments.
Few time-sharing interests are sold at such a low price as to not warrant some
sort of financing. Many and perhaps most Americans are used to financing any
purchase costing more than a few hundred dollars. As noted by the developer of
Kona Billfisher, a project that has offered reasonable interest terms but no
financing: "Financing must be provided. We had gone to market thinking that
all buyers would pay cash because of the low price tag." To prospective pur-
chasers who are used to buying their cars, furniture, and major appliances on
time, the $2,055 price tag of a time-sharing interest is an amount that must be
financed if a sale is to be made.
Id
148. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. The low cost can mean that a shorter
period of amortization is feasible.
149. Ingleby, supra note 11, at 102. Ingleby raised another alternative method of
providing financing stating: "One developer is seeking to solve the financing problem in
his development by converting the existing interim financing on the project to permanent
financing and offering prospective buyers real estate contracts (land contracts) rather than
mortgage financing." Id
150. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. According to one commentator, a
client interested in purchasing a timeshare interest:
[s]hould be advised that the usual incidents of ownership or real estate, such as
the ability to borrow against his interest, will be severely curtailed due to the
limits of the interest, lack of an established secondary market and the lack of
familiarity by many lenders with timesharing concepts.
Straw, Representing a Purchaser of a Time Share, II COLO. LAw. 1543, 1548 (1982).
In the absence of comprehensive timeshare legislation, timeshare projects can fail mis-
erably, affecting not only purchasers, but lenders who have taken mortgages on timeshare
interests. For an example of a New York timeshare development's demise and the effect
on secondary market mortgagees, see Mpls. Star & Tribune, Feb. 23, 1983, at 6B, col. 5-6;
id., Mar. 2, 1983, at 5B, col. 3; id., Mar. 9, 1983, at 3B, col. 4-6, 4B, col. 3-4.
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E. Title Insurance
The validity and applicability of title insurance to timeshare units is
somewhat uncertain.15' Lenders, purchasers,15 2 and developers 5 3 gener-
ally prefer a title insurance policy.154 Thus, title insurance is commonly
used in timeshare projects.'55 Usually, an abstract of title on the under-
lying real estate will not be furnished for each timeshare interest, since
"[tlhe cost of furnishing a separate abstract for each week - 52 for the
year - for each apartment would be prohibitive."'' 56 Some timeshare
policy provisions are similar to those covering traditional condominium
units.' 57 Other provisions need to be specifically tailored to accommo-
date the timeshare concept.158 A timeshare title insurance policy should
address matters concerning tax liens,'59 holdover owners,' 60  and
partitions.161
State statutes governing condominiums,162 recordation,16 3 and waiver
of the right to partition' 6 4 should be consulted. In Minnesota, these stat-
utes are silent with respect to timeshare interests.' 65 Enactment of
timeshare legislation that delineates the incidents of timeshare ownership
will promote the availability of title insurance.
151. See 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, § 17C.01H, at 17C-4.34; Comment, supra
note 5, at 439-40. See generally Certilman, Special Title Problems Relating to Commum'ly Associa-
tion Housing, in TITLE INSURANCE: SPECIAL PROBLEMS 93 (1980) (recognizes timeshar-
ing's unique features affecting title insurance); Eagan, Title Insurance for Condominiums, 14
HASTINGS L.J. 210 (1963) (analysis from title insurer's perspective).
152. See 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, § 17C.01H; at 17C-4.35.
153. Id at 17C-4.34.
154. Id. at 17C-4.35. But see Straw, supra note 150, at 1545. "Title insurance is not
always provided by the developer due to the tremendous aggregate cost." Id
155. Eastman, supra note 1, at 161.
156. d.
157. See 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, § 17C.01[2], at 17C-4.34.
158. See id.
159. See id. at § 17C-4.34; Pollack, supra note 7, at 289-90.
160. See I ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, § 17C.0IH, at 17C-4.34; Eastman, supra
note 1, at 162.
161. See 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, § 17C.01H, at 17C-4.34; see also supra note
54 and accompanying text (discussing supplemental declarations).
162. See I ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, § 17C.01H, at 17C-4.34.
163. See Varner, supra note 17, at 77.
164. See I ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, § 17C.0IH, at 17C-4.35.
165. In order to effect a valid contract of title insurance, the insured need only have an
interest in the property so that he would suffer a pecuniary loss if the title were clouded or
defective. Rove, Claim Against the Title Insurer, in TITLE INSURANCE IN MAJOR REAL ES-
TATE TRANSACTIONS 239, 252-53 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice No. 144, 1978)
(citing Empire Devel. Co. v. Title Guar. and Trust Co., 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E. 468 (1918);
Wheeler v. Real Est. Title Ins. and Trust Co., 160 Pa. 408, 28 A. 849 (1914); 9 APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 5204 (1943)).
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F Management
Due to the large number and transient nature of timeshare owners,
good management 16 6 is more critical to timeshare condominiums 16 7 than
for traditional condominiums.16 8 Developers should select an appropri-
ate management vehicle,169 which may be either internal or external.170
The external, professional management, approach is preferable because
it requires little owner involvement. 17' Developers may include this
management vehicle in the declaration.
72
166. See Boster, supra note 20, at 108; Pollack, supra note 7, at 288-89; Rosenblatt, supra
note I, at 30 (management is essential factor in timeshare projects because it maintains
value of units). Greater reliance on external management may, however, make timeshare
interests securities under the Howey test. See supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text.
167. See Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 30. Rosenblatt stated:
In a condominium, owners are continually in residence, or at least in ownership,
and have an incentive to take a role in Association affairs. Of course, some own-
ers are more active than others. An Association of timeshare owners is, because
of the substantially larger membership, more unwieldy. Furthermore, only a
minority of owners are simultaneously in residence and it may be hard to estab-
lish broad Association participation.
Id.; see also Boster, supra note 20, at 108; Pollack, supra note 7, at 288 (timeshare owners, as
compared to traditional condominium owners are extremely transient). Boster noted that,
"[iln a time-sharing project, where the number of individual owners can exceed 10,000
and where (during the season) there is virtually 100 percent occupancy of each unit by
several different owners, management can make or break a project very quickly." Boster,
supra note 20, at 108.
168. See Ingleby, supra note 11, at 102. Ingleby believed that there were only three
basic approaches to timesharing management: (1) lease arrangements; (2) trust inden-
tures; and (3) pure agencies. He concluded that the pure agency form has the fewest
disadvantages. Id Impliedly, Ingleby must have assumed that only external management
was appropriate because he avoided discussion of available internal approaches. See infra
notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
169. See Varner, supra note 17, at 109. For an insight into characteristics of the inter-
nal approach, see Scavo, Legal Aspects of Timeshare Owners Association. The Lawyer's Role in
Document Drafting and Formation of the Association, in THE LEGAL AsPEcTs OF REAL ESTATE
TIMESHARING 505 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982).
170. Professional management is preferable because timeshare owners are only present
at the project a few weeks each year, making it difficult for them to monitor day to day
operations. See Boster, supra note 20, at 108; Rosenblatt, supra note l, at 30. Another
reason for professional management is that "a timeshared building must be operated as a
first class hotel or motel with numerous employees to maintain the building and the units
and to arrange for the transition of ownership and use on a recurring basis." Straw, supra
note 150, at 1547. The internal method, though not preferable, remains viable. See Var-
ner, supra note 17, at 109. The internal method involves management by an owners' asso-
ciation. This method is difficult to use in a timeshare project. See supra note 168 and
accompanying text.
171. See Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 30. A declaration is the "underlying organic 'con-
stitution' "of both condominiums and timeshare projects. Id. at 15. "[M]any declarations
require mandatory professional management. Other developers, while in favor of profes-
sional management, prefer a Declaration which allows the Association a free hand in de-
ciding whether to hire outside professional help." d. at 30.
172. See Boster, supra note 20, at 108; Pollack, supra note 7, at 288-89. See generally
25
et al.: Regulating Timeshare Interests in Minnesota: A Comprehensive Solu
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
A variety of management functions should be determined at the outset
to prevent subsequent problems. 173 These functions include: (1) refur-
nishing and repairing the units and common elements;174 (2) paying for
materials and labor; 175 (3) paying taxes and assessments; 176 (4) paying
for accounting and legal services;1 77 (5) providing insurance coverage;1 78
(6) enforcing covenants, conditions, and restrictions of the association;'
79
and (7) assessing and collecting fees to pay for these activities.18o Once
the proper management vehicle and its appropriate functions are deter-
mined, the timeshare condominium should operate efficiently.
G. Tax Aspects
The tax consequences of timeshare development and ownership pres-
ent a number of interesting issues. Examining the appropriate basis for
real estate tax purposes,' 8 ' the tax advantages for income tax pur-
poses,' 82 and the effect of tax liens,' 83 assists in unraveling the timeshare
concept.
Davis,supra note 5, at 1192-93 (detailed checklist for determining management functions).
Management functions can be set forth in the declaration. See Rosenblatt, supra note
1, at 30. They can also be determined by vote of the association of timeshare owners.
"Since it is almost a certainty that a small percentage of the owners will be present at any
owners association meeting, the management will normally have a large proxy vote."
Varner, supra note 17, at 109. Another approach, "[g]iven the unwieldy nature of a
timeshare Association, [is to] utilize powers-of-attorney." Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 30.
"Each owner executes such a power in favor of a designated person, often the outside
manager." Id.
173. Pollack, supra note 7, at 288.
174. Id
175. Pollack, supra note 7, at 288.
176. Id.; see inia notes 184-88 and accompanying text. See generally Davis, supra note 5,
at 1193 (to determine whether taxes should be component of the fee one should ascertain
whether local real estate taxes are assessed separately to unit or interest, or to entire pro-
ject as a whole). For further discussion of real estate taxes, see infa notes 184-98 and
accompanying text.
177. Pollack, supra note 7, at 288-89.
178. Id See generally Kenyon, Insuring the Condominium, 19 PRAC. LAW. 13 (1973) (insur-
ance in relation to condominium developments).
179. Pollack, supra note 7, at 289. The simplest way for management to collect fees is
to impose a lien on the timeshare interest for all delinquencies. See Varner, supra note 17,
at 77-78. The developer must "prepare penalty and enforcement procedures that will
protect nondelinquent owners from the arrearages of others." Davis,supra note 5, at 1192.
180. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1193-94; Pollack, supra note 7, at 289-90.
181. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 290. "The tax angles alone used to make the purchase
of a vacation home an attractive investment. . . . Unfortunately, Congress has taken
away some of the favorable tax breaks available to owners of vacation or resort condomin-
iums ...... KEY TAX ANGLES TO CONSIDER BEFORE INVESTING IN CONDOMINIUMS
AND COOPERATIVE APARTMENTS 7 (P-H Tax Savings Series no. 14, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as KEY TAx ANGLES].
182. See Malleris, supra note 17, at 100; Pohoryles, supra note 82, at 23.
183. Davis, supra note 5, at 1193; Pollack, supra note 7, at 290-91.
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I. Real Estate Taxation
For real estate tax purposes, local tax assessment policy determines
whether: (1) each time period is assessed individually; 184 (2) each unit is
assessed individually;18 5 or (3) the project is assessed as a whole.186 In the
latter two instances, taxes must be prorated to the individual timeshare
as they are in conventional condominiums. 187 Tax assessment valuation
must also take into account the effects of seasonal demand.188 Prime
season timeshares should bear a proportionately higher tax than off-sea-
son timeshares because of their greater value. 189
The appropriate basis for assessing the timeshare tax valuation is an
unresolved issue. There are three alternatives. The first and least desira-
ble is unit sellout price.190 The sellout price is inflated 19 1 far above the
intrinsic value of comparable non-timeshare units.192 The second alter-
native applies the basis of an analogous non-timeshare unit.193 This ap-
proach is also undesirable because it ignores the sale price of the actual
unit assessed. '
94
The third alternative taxes the actual value acquired by the pur-
chaser. 95 This alternative best reflects the interest involved and is
favorable to all parties. Its basis takes into account the duration of the
interest and its relative seasonal value.196 This alternative provides the
appropriate basis upon which to assess the timeshare unit's tax valua-
tion.197 Minnesota needs legislation that allows fractionalization of tax
asssessments to permit timeshare owners to receive separate taxation of
their interests. 198
184. Davis, supra note 5, at 1193.
185. Id.
186. Pollack, supra note 7, at 290-91.
187. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1194. This is the major problem with traditional square
footage assessments. See id.
188. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 290-91; see also supra note 120 and accompanying text
(discussing seasonal effect on timeshare unit pricing).
189. See Varner, supra note 17, at 109. But see Davis, supra note 5, at 1194 (percentage
of sales price is soundest course).
190. The value of the individual shares, when totaled, exceeds the value of the unit
itself. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
191. See Varner, supra note 17, at 109.
192. See id.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. This approach would provide local tax authorities with a basis representing the
full value of the condominium.
196. Although interests vary, the typical length is two weeks. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
197. The unit basis is derived by adding together the number of interest values. For a
general discussion of interest valuation, see Davis, supra note 34, at 53-54; Hart, supra note
7, at 110-11.
198. See Davis, Real Estate Time Sharing in Flonda--A Practitioner's View, 57 FLA. B.J. 116,
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2. Tax Advantages
Once the appropriate tax basis is determined,199 timesharing presents
no unique tax problems. 200 Owners,201 however, will need to determine
119 (1982); Johnakin, Legislation For Time Share Ownership Projects, 10 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 606, 610 (1975); Malleris, supra note 17, at 100; Comment, supra note 21, at 312.
Minnesota Statutes section 515A. I-105(a) provides that condominium units are sepa-
rate parcels of real estate for purposes of taxation. MINN. STAT. § 515A.1-105(a) (1982).
Without such legislation, the convenient method of taxing the entire parcel may be used
by taxing authorities. As one author has noted:
If prophylactic legislation was necessary to protect condominium unit owners
from this hazard, similar legislation is needed for time share owners afortiori.
Even without the benefit of such legislation, condominium unit owners could
probably have argued successfully that a condominium is merely a novel form of
subdivision, and that the tax authorities are therefore obliged to assess the units
separately just as they would the individual lots in a traditional subdivision. (A
problem would still remain with respect to the common elements.) But the time
share owners of a vacation home cannot make a similar argument. Whether
ownership is structured under a time-span scheme or an interval scheme, the fact
remains that each vacation home comprises a single parcel of real property.
Without legislation expressly requiring the fractionalization of tax assessments,
time share owners would have no more right to separate taxation of their time
share estates than would any other individuals who own different estates or inter-
ests in the same property. Tenants in common are not entitled under any state
law to separate assessment and taxation of their undivided interests, and time
share owners would not be entitled to any different treatment unless special legis-
lation were enacted for their benefit.
Johnakin, supra, at 610. For an example of the special legislation advocated by Mr.
Johnakin, see Colorado Revised Statutes section 38-33-111(3), which provides:
With respect to each time share unit, each owner of a time share estate therein
shall be individually liable to the unit owners' association or corporation for all
assessments, property taxes both real and personal, and charges levied pursuant
to the project instruments against or with respect to that unit, and such associa-
tion or corporation shall be liable for the payment thereof, except to the extent
that such instruments provide to the contrary. However, with respect to each
other, each time share owner shall be responsible only for a fraction of such
assessments, property taxes both real and personal, and charges proportionate to
the magnitude of his undivided interest in the fee to the unit.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-33-111(3) (1982).
199. For income tax purposes, the actual basis is the cost of the timeshare interest.
200. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1193; Yurow, supra note 23, at 1217. This is because the
vast majority of timeshare interests are acquired primarily for personal use. Id, see also
supra note 101 and accompanying text (timeshare units are not securities because they are
purchased for personal use).
201. This Note focuses on individuals who own timeshare units for personal use rather
than for business purposes. Units used for business purposes have peculiar tax advantages,
such as: (1) they are depreciable; (2) they permit an investment credit, see Yurow, supra
note 23, at 1215-17; (3) hobby loss deductions are available, if the units are used for busi-
ness and personal purposes; and (4) the units' expenses may be treated as business ex-
penses. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1194 n.25; Pollack, supra note 7, at 290.
The Internal Revenue Service has proposed regulations to section 280A that would
significantly alter the current tax treatment of timesharing interests. See 45 Fed. Reg.
52399 (1980) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed August 7, 1980). Section 280A
of the Code generally disallows deductions for the business use or rental of a "dwelling
unit" which the taxpayer uses as a residence. See I.R.C. § 280A(a) (1976 and Supp. IV
1980). Under the proposed regulations, it is unclear whether a timeshare interest would
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the portion of owning, operating, and maintenance expenses that are de-
ductible for income tax purposes. 20 2 Subject to certain limitations,
20 3
section 183(b) of the Internal Revenue Code2o4 provides that individuals
may take deductions when they are engaged in an activity not for
profit. 20 5 Since timeshare ownership is largely an activity not engaged
in for profit,206 owners will be unable to offset losses from the ownership
and operation of the property against taxable income from other
sources. 20 7 Thus, maintenance charges will generally be non-
deductible.
2Oa
be considered a "dwelling unit," or if it would fall into the category of exceptions created
for hotels, motels, and similar establishments. See Vogel, The Tax Consequences of Tine-
Sharing, 10J. REAL EST. TAX'N 323, 336-37 (1983). The characterization of the unit will
determine whether expenses associated with the business use of the unit are deductible.
The proposed regulations affect the characterization of the owner's interest in the
timeshare unit, by providing that "each of the persons with an interest in the unit subject
to the time sharing arrangements shall be considered to have a continuing interest in the
unit regardless of the terms of the interest under local law." Prop. Treas. Reg. § 280A-
3(0(3), 45 Fed. Reg. 52399 (1980). This definition ignores the temporal nature of a
timeshare interest, expanding the owner's interest from the actual one or two weeks which
he owns, to a year long continuing obligation. See Vogel, supra, at 337.
This Note does not focus on tax advantages available in non-ownership arrange-
ments. Vacation license or right-to-use timesharing present many problems, particularly
from the developer's perspective. See Davis, supra note 34, at 53-54; Pollack, supra note 7,
at 290-91; Yurow, supra note 23, at 1200, 1218-19.
Under a timeshare ownership program, a developer "would appear to be in essen-
tially the same tax position as any other condominium seller. In computing his profit on
the sale of an undivided interest in a condominium unit, he would deduct the portion of
the costs allocable to such undivided interest." Id. at 1217; see Davis, supra note 34, at 53.
202. Yurow, supra note 23, at 1205. For an analysis of tax advantages available to
timeshare condominium associations, see Simon, Legal Aspects of Ti~neshare Owners Associa-
lions, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 517, 524-26 (P.L.I. Real
Estate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982).
203. See Yurow, supra note 23, at 1205.
204. Internal Revenue Code section 183(b) provides:
(b) DEDUCTIONS ALLOWABLE - In the case of an activity not engaged
in for profit to which subsection (a) applies, there shall be allowed-
(1) the deductions which would be allowable under this chapter for the taxable
year without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in for profit, and
(2) a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions which would be allowa-
ble under this chapter for the taxable year only if such activity were engaged in
for profit, but only to the extent that the gross income derived from such activity
for the taxable year exceeds the deductions allowable by reason of paragraph (1).
I.R.C. § 183(b) (1976).
205. An activity not engaged in for profit is defined in Iiternal Revenue Code section
183(c) as "any activity other than one with respect to which deductions are allowable for
the taxable year under section 162 or under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 212." I.R.C.
§ 183(c) (1976). For the effect of the Regulations and case law on activities not engaged in
for profit, see Yurow, supra note 23, at 1208-15.
206. See Yurow, supra note 23, at 1208-15.
207. Id at 1205.
208. See KEY TAx ANGLES, supra note 181, at 1 12.1 (only maintenance charges for
common elements clearly not deductible); Bush, Planning to Meet Problems of Nonbusiness
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Owners may take real estate tax209 and interest 2 10 deductions. Unin-
sured casualty losses2 t" should also be deductible. 2 12 Since it is unlikely
the unit would ever serve as a residence, the tax deferral rules on sale or
exchange of a residence would not apply.2 13 Upon resale, the timeshare
interest should receive capital gains treatment. 2 14 The effect of these tax
consequences is negligible because the value of the timeshare itself is
minimal.215
3. Federal Tax Liens
The threat of federal tax liens is a problem with many forms of joint
ownership. 2 16 Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code2' 7 imposes a
tax lien for unpaid federal taxes in favor of the United States.218 Once
Residential Propert, Co-ops. Condominiums, Non-Exotc Realty; Exotic Types of Real operty; Time-
shared Property, Domicile and Conlts of Laws, 35 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1403, 1419 (1977);
Pollack, supra note 7, at 291 (citing Vacation Home, MONEY, Oct. 1978, at 59).
209. I.R.C. § 183 (1976); see KEY TAx ANGLES, supra note 181, at 3.1; Bush, supra
note 208, at 1419; Davis, supra note 5, at 1194; Pollack, supra note 7, at 290; Yurow, supra
note 23, at 1217.
The deduction of real estate taxes is set forth in Internal Revenue Code section
164(a)(1). See I.R.C. § 164(a)(1) (1976). To insure that the complete deduction is used,
the timeshare owner should make certain that taxes paid on common elements are pro-
rated and deducted. This deduction is often overlooked when the common elements and
the unit are separately assessed. See KEY TAx ANGLES, supra note 181, at [ 13.1.
210. I.R.C. § 183 (1976); see KEY TAX ANGLES, supra note 181, at 13.2; Bush, supra
note 208, at 1419; Davis, supra note 5, at 1194; Pohoryles, supra note 82, at 23; Pollack,
supra note 7, at 290; Yurow, supra note 23, at 1217.
The deduction for mortgage interest payments is set forth in Internal Revenue Code
section 163. See I.R.C. § 163 (1976). It is important to note that "an interest deduction is
also permissible where the [timeshare] owner assumes pro rata an existing mortgage se-
cured by the entire complex, not just the unit." KEY TAX ANGLES, supra note 181, at
13.2 (citing Rev. Rul. 64-31, 1964-1 C.B. 300).
211. I.R.C. § 165(c)(3) (1976).
212. I.R.C. § 183 (1976); see KEY TAx ANGLES, supra note 181, at 3.3. Examples of
casualty losses include fire, tornado, flood, or vandalism. Id Casualty loss deductions are
set forth in Internal Revenue Code sections 123 and 1231. I.R.C. §§ 123, 1231 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
213. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1194.
214. Pollack, supra note 7, at 290 (quoting Davis, supra note 5, at 1194). The timeshare
interest meets the definition of a capital asset. Davis, supra note 5, at 1194 n.29; see Hart,
supra note 7, at 110.
215. Pollack, supra note 7, at 291; see Straw, supra note 150, at 1543 (average price of
timeshare equivalent to medium-priced automobile); supra note 146 and accompanying
text.
216. See Davis, supra note 5, at 1187; Eastman,supra note 1, at 153; Malleris, supra note
17, at 10-11; Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 31; Comment, Innovative Concept, supra note 44, at
441-42; Comment, supra note 5, at 428; Comment, supra note 21, at 304; see also Pollack,
supra note 7, at 289-90 (threat of federal tax lien creates title insurance problems). For a
detailed analysis of the nature and history of the impact of federal tax liens upon joint
ownership arrangements, see Comment, supra note 5, at 429-31.
217. I.R.C. § 6321 (1976).
218. Id, see Comment, supra note 5, at 429.
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triggered,2 19 the lien attaches to "all property and rights to property...
belonging to. . .[the person] liable to pay any tax."22 0 Section 7403 of
the Code22 t provides that a court may sell any property that the tax-
payer has an interest in to satisfy the lien.222 This presents a clear
threat 22 3 of forced judicial sale224 to timeshare owners in a time span
219. See W. PLUMB, FEDERAL TAX LIENS 10 (3d ed. 1972) (extensive survey of formali-
ties required to impose lien).
220. Comment, supra note 5, at 429 (quoting I.R.C. § 6321 (1976)) (emphasis added).
221. I.R.C. § 7403 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
222. Comment, supra note 5, at 429. The government is authorized to bring an action
"to enforce the ... lien . . .or to subject any property, of whatever nature, of the delin-
quent, or in which he has any right, title or interest, to the payment of such tax or liabil-
ity." I.R.C. § 7403(a), reprinted in Comment, supra note 5, at 429 n.27 (emphasis added).
223. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
224. To prevent foreclosure and sale of the unit, it would be practical for the co-owners
to purchase the delinquent owner's interest to avoid losing their interests. Comment, supra
note 5, at 431. If not, the United States, as a creditor, may foreclose and redeem.
Internal Revenue Code section 7425(a) provides, in part, that liens must be dis-
charged by:
Judicial proceedings. - If the United States is not joined as a party, a judgment
in any civil action or suit described in subsection (a) of section 2410 of title 28 of
the United States Code, or a judicial sale pursuant to such a judgment, with
respect to property on which the United States has or claims a lien under the
provisions of this title -
(1) shall be made subject to and without disturbing the lien of the United
States, if notice of such lien has been filed in the place provided by law for
such filing at the time such action or suit is commenced, or
(2) shall have the same effect with respect to the discharge or divestment
of such lien of the United States as may be provided with respect to such
matters by the local law of the place where such property tu situated, if no notice of
such lien has been filed in the place provided by law for such filing at the
time such action or suit is commenced or if the law makes no provision for
such filing.
If a judicial sale of property pursuant to a judgment in any civil action or suit to
which the United States is not a party discharges a lien of the United States
arising under the provisions of this title, the United States may claim, with the
same priority as its lien had against the property sold, the proceeds (exclusive of
costs) of such sale at any time before the distribution of such proceeds is ordered.
I.R.C. § 7425(a) (1976) (emphasis added). In Minnesota, the law governing judicial fore-
closure is found in Minnesota Statutes sections 581.01 to .12.
Minnesota Statutes section 581.10, entitled Redemption by mortgagor, creditor, provides
that "Creditors having a lien may redeem in the order and manner specified in section
580.24 .... " MINN. STAT. § 581.10 (1982). Minnesota Statutes section 580.24 provides:
If no such redemption be made by the mortgagor, his personal representatives or
assigns, the senior creditor having a lien, legal or equitable, upon the mortgaged
premises, or some part thereof, subsequent to the mortgage, may redeem within
five days after the expiration of the redemption periodspecifwd in section 580.23 and
each subsequent creditor having a lien in succession, according to priority of
liens, within five days after the time allowed the prior lienholder, respectively,
may redeem by paying the amount aforesaid and all liens prior to his own held
by the person from whom redemption is made; provided that no creditor shall be
entitled to redeem unless within the period allowed for redemption he file for
record notice of his intention to redeem with the county recorder of each county
where the mortgage is recorded.
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arrangement.2 25
The IRS, in a private letter ruling,226 has mitigated the threat of these
liens.227 The ruling stated that the IRS "does not expect to partition
timeshare projects and that it will seek to enforce its lien only against the
delinquent taxpayer's individual interest." 228 Since foreclosures pursu-
ant to federal tax liens are rare, 22 9 the likelihood of such a sale is
minimal.
230
III. SOLUTION - COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION
Minnesota needs legislation to resolve these uncertainties and lay to
rest the warranted apprehensions presented above. 23 ' The Legislature
may approach this task by promulgating regulations, 232 enacting en-
MINN. STAT. § 580.24 (1982) (emphasis added).
Internal Revenue Code section 7425(d) provides that the United States may redeem
"within the period of 120 days from the date of such sale or the period allowable for
redemption under local law, whichever is longer." I.R.C. § 7425(d) (1976) (emphasis ad-
ded). The redemption period specified in Minnesota Statutes section 580.23(1) is six
months, which pursuant to Code section 7425(d), would control. Therefore, the United
States would be compelled to follow the procedure.
225. Owners in a time span arrangement,see supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text,
are candidates for the impact of federal tax liens because they own their interests jointly,
as tenants in common. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. On the other hand,
owners in an interval estate arrangement, see supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text,
appear to avoid the impact of federal tax liens because they hold an estate in fee. At least
two authors in this area have adopted the view that interval owners are free from federal
tax liens because satisfaction of the lien can only be accomplished by sale of an interest in
the property, not the property itself. See Eastman, supra note 1, at 153 n.12 (citing Outen,
Interval Titles and Ttle Insurance, LAW TITLE NEWS, Mar.-Apr. 1976, at 7); Comment, supra
note 5, at 428 n.21; cf. Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 31 n.47 (recognizing but not explicitly
ratifying the position taken in the Comment).
226. Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 31.
227. Id (citing Internal Revenue Service, Priv. L. Rul. No. 7831029 (May 4, 1978)).
228. Rosenblatt,supra note 1, at 31;see United States v. Eaves, 499 F.2d 869 (10th Cir.
1974) (section 7403 authorizes but does not mandate sale to satisfy federal tax lien of a
single covenant).
229. See W. PLUMB, supra note 219, at 3.
230. Comment, supra note 5, at 431. The author points out that ifjudicial foreclosure
is sought, courts should consider a number of factors unique to timesharing, such as the
innocence of co-tenants, hardships, administrative cost, inconvenience, and economic im-
practicality of selling all the interests in a unit. Id.;rsee Davis, supra note 5, at 1183; Varner,
supra note 17, at 78 n.9.
231. See Simon & Rugani, supra note 20, at 52. Legislation will "provide the attorney
with a helpful checklist of relevant factor and possible mechanisms for assuring adequate
protection for the time-share purchaser." Id; see also Davis, supra note 198, at 117;
Johnakin,supra note 198, at 607, 612; Malleris,supra note 17, at 101; Comment, supra note
7, at 217; Comment, supra note 21, at 302 (where timesharing legislation is absent, whole-
sale application of numerous provisions produces awkward interpretations, leaving
timesharing dependent upon common law principles for validity).
232. See Catalina, supra note 7, at 146; Gunnar, supra note 7, at 41.
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abling legislation,233 or adopting a comprehensive model act. 2 34
A. Regulations
Federal, 235 state,236 and local governments23 7 have promulgated regu-
lations on timesharing through administrative rulings238 and statutory
enactment.23 9 These deal primarily with deceptive sales practices and
developer undercapitalization. 240 The regulations, like many other con-
sumer protection laws, focus on procedural rather than substantive as-
233. See Comment, supra note 7, at 217.
234. See Burek, supra note 67, at 690; Podgers, supra note 4, at 543-44; Annot., 6 A.L.R.
4th 1288, 1289 n.2 (1981).
235. Regulation of timesharing at the federal level includes involvement of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission. See Catalina, supra note 7, at 149; Eastman, supra note 1,
at 158-59; Gunnar, supra note 7, at 41; Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1288, 1291 (1981); see also supra
notes 78-106 and accompanying text (discussing SEC involvement). The Federal Trade
Commission is also involved in regulating many aspects of timesharing. See Bloch, Regula-
tion of Thnesharng, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 289 (P.L.I.
Real Estate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982). A number of other federal authorities are
involved, including the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Depart-
ment of Justice, and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. Id. at 383, 387-88.
236. See Ingersoll, supra note 2. The author provides a national survey of the state
regulatory response to timesharing either through direct or indirect application of various
registration laws. See id. at 323. For a similar survey, see Bloch, supra note 235, at 295-96.
237. See Bilbray, Local Controls of Tinesharing, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE
TIMESHARING 451 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And Practice No. 220, 1982); Martin, supra
note 6, at 2807-08; Mulligan, supra note 17, at 2802; Penwell, supra note 20, at 65; Straw,
supra note 150, at 1544.
238. See Catalina, supra note 7, at 146; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 718 (West Supp.
1982); FLA. ADMIN. CODE Rule 2-23.01 (1982).
239. See Catalina, supra note 7, at 146; see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10 to -230
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
240. Catalina, supra note 7, at 146. Incidents of deceptive trade practices in the
timeshare area occur with considerable frequency. One such incident arose in Hawaii,
where the solicitation of timeshare purchasers was described as follows:
Besides the ever-present B-girls flaunting their wares beneath the graceful palms
of Kalakaua Avenue and the shadowy youths tempting passersby with whispered
offers of choice marijuana buds, the tourist must run a gantlet of sidewalk hawk-
ers standing in booths and packed seven or eight to a block in some areas. The
pitchmen promise all sorts of good things in return for just a few minutes of your
time listening to a real-estate spiel.
Would you like a rental car for $5 a day? How about free tickets to the Don
Ho Show or Germaine's luau? Do you like macadamia nuts? We'll give you a
case of them free. Two cases. Some pineapples, maybe? Just give us 90 minutes
of your time. We want to tell you about a great opportunity to save money.
You can just go to our party, listen to the talk and leave. No gimmicks, no
pressure. We'll even refund your cabfare if you go.
This is the siren song of the condominium time-share salesman, and it has
helped to ruin hundreds of vacationers' dream trips to Hawaii.
Zonana, Wat'iktis Rtichmen for Time-Sharing Resorts Leave Many Disgruntled Buyers in Their
Wake, Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1983, at 46, col. 1. Arguably, Minnesota has a statute which
could regulate this type of practice. See MINN. STAT. § 325D.44, subd. 1(9)-(12) (1982).
19841
33
et al.: Regulating Timeshare Interests in Minnesota: A Comprehensive Solu
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
pects of timeshare transactions.
2 41
Minnesota has a similar regulatory response in the Minnesota Subdi-
vided Land Sales and Practices Act (Act).242 Although the Act does not
specifically address timesharing, a number of Minnesota timeshare
projects are being regulated under it.243 The Act authorizes the Com-
241. For example, these statutes require developers to presubmit plans, documents,
and detailed information about offerings; give adequate warning to buyers concerning
their liabilities under the by-laws; allow a cooling off period during which the buyer may
rescind the contract; refrain from deceptive trade practices; and maintain funds in escrow
to protect purchasers' rights in case of developer insolvency. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. chs.
718, 721 (West Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 27, ch. 32 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1982).
242. MINN. STAT. §§ 83.20-42 (1982). For an analysis of the Act, see Comment, Cubes
of Air Planning A Condominium Development Under The Minnesota Act, 1 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 89, 112-15 (1974).
243. The issue is raised, but not answered, in Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 26 n.16. To
fall under the purview of the Act, the concept of timesharing must fall into the definition
of "subdivision," as provided in section 83.20(11) of the Act:
"Subdivision" and "subdivided land" means any land wherever located, improved
or unimproved, whether adjacent or not, which is divided or proposed to be
divided for the purpose of disposition pursuant to a common promotional
scheme or plan of advertising and disposition by a single subdivider or a group of
subdividers. If the land is designated or advertised as a common unit or by a
common name the land shall be presumed, without regard to the number of lots
covered by each individual offering, as being offered for disposition as part of a
common promotional plan.
MINN. STAT. § 83.20(11) (1982) (emphasis added).
It appears that a developer creating a project from the ground up would come under
the scope of the Act, but if an existing condominium, apartment, or hotel complex were
divided into timeshares, it is questionable whether the Act would apply. In timesharing,
time and not "land" is being divided. See Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 26 n. 18. "[T]here
are sound reasons why a timeshare project which does not intensify the use of the land
should not be considered a subdivision for local zoning purposes, and the law remains
unsettled in Minnesota." Id. at 26; See Board of County Comm'rs v. Colorado Bd. of
Assessment Appeals, 628 P.2d 156 (Colo. App. 1981) (timesharing neither changes nor
increases use of land). But see Cal-Am Corp. v. Dep't of Real Estate, 104 Cal. App. 3d 453,
163 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1980) (for regulatory purposes timesharing is considered a subdivision
in sales of vacation memberships); Town of Tuftonburo v. Lakeside Colony, Inc., 119
N.H. 445, 403 A.2d 410 (1979) (for local zoning purposes subdivision occurs upon creation
of timeshare project).
According to Ms. Lorraine Rowe of the Securities and Real Estate Division of the
Minnesota Department of Commerce, the policy in Minnesota is to treat timesharing as a
subdivision of land. This policy was formulated approximately six years ago by the Com-
missioner of the Securities and Real Estate Division. Of six timeshare developments
within Minnesota to date, two are regulated under the Act and four are exempt under
Minnesota Statutes section 83.26(1)(g). Telephone interview with Lorraine Rowe, Securi-
ties and Real Estate Division, Minnesota Department of Commerce (Mar. 4, 1983).
Section 83.26 (1)(g) provides that the Act does not apply:
If the land is located within the corporate limits of a municipality as defined in
section 462.352, subdivision 2, or within any subdivision located within a town
or municipality located within 20 miles of the city limits of a city of the first class
or within three miles of the city limits of a city of the second class, or within two
miles of the city limit of a city of the third or fourth class in this state. The
commissioner may, by written rule or order, suspend, wholly revoke, or further
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missioner of Securities and Real Estate to administer its provisions244 us-
ing designated enforcement powers.245 The Act focuses on procedures
and consumer protection. 246 Like similar regulatory schemes in other
states,24 7 the Act does not provide a comprehensive solution to timeshar-
ing's unique problems.
B. Enabling Legis/ation
Many states, including Minnesota, 248 have conventional condomin-
ium 2 49 enabling legislation.250 These acts arguably apply to timesharing
without specifically providing for it.251 Yet, they still subject timesharing
to numerous other statutory provisions and common law principles to
determine its viability.2 52 The application of condominium legislation to
timeshare interests is presently a question of statutory construction. 253
Silent enabling legislation and a scarcity of case law2 54 subject timeshar-
ing to varied treatment within and between jurisdictions. 255
Other states expressly recognize timesharing within their enabling
acts.2 56 Statutory recognition eliminates some unwarranted apprehen-
condition this exemption, or may require, prior to the first disposition of subdi-
vided lands, such further information with respect thereto as may be necessary
for the protection of purchasers consistent with the provisions hereof.
MINN. STAT. § 83.26(l)(g) (1982).
The cost to the developer of a timeshare project that is not exempt from the Act is
$250 plus $1 for each unit or interest, with a maximum fee of $2,500. Id § 83.23(2).
244. See MINN. STAT. § 83.21 (1982).
245. See id. § 83.35.
246. See, e.g., id § 83.24 (public offering statement); id. § 83.27 (inquiry and examina-
tion); id. § 83.28 (sales contract-rescission); id. § 83.32 (inspection of records); idi § 83.37
(penalties-civil remedies).
247. Cf Eastman,supra note 1, at 160-61 (applicability of North Dakota's Land Subdi-
vision Act to timesharing); Gunnar, supra note 7, at 35 (Oregon's subdivision control laws
and timesharing). For a discussion of the effect of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclo-
sure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), see Note, S275 - The Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 714 (1967).
248. See MINN. STAT. §§ 515A.1-101-.4-118 (1982).
249. A conventional condominium is divided into three dimensions: height, breadth,
and depth. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
250. An enabling statute, in its rudimentary definition, is one that "confer[s] new pow-
ers." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 472 (5th ed. 1979).
251. Comment, supra note 7, at 217; see Eastman, supra note 1, at 154-56; Rosenblatt,
supra note 1, at 27 (it is possible to prepare and record joint declaration creating both
condominium and timesharing interest); see also supra note 3 (discussing creation of
timeshare interests).
252. Comment, supra note 7, at 217; see Malleris, supra note 17, at 101; Rosenblatt,
supra note 1, at 26.
253. Comment, supra note 7, at 217.
254. See 1 ROHAN & RESKIN, supra note 35, § 16.02, at 16-8; Comment, supra note 7, at
220. The timeshare concept is a recent phenomenon in the United States. As a result,
there is little case law on the subject.
255. See Comment, supra note 7, at 220.
256. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 11003.5 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV.
1984]
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sions based on misconceptions of timesharing, but falls short of providing
a comprehensive solution to the many legal issues involved.2 57 Enabling
legislation pertaining to conventional or timeshare condominiums offers
an incomplete and inadequate solution.
C Comprehensive Legislation - The Model Real Estate Time-Share Act
As an alternative, the Legislature could enact a comprehensive piece
of legislation that satisfies both the regulatory and enabling goals of
other jurisdictions. Moreover, comprehensive legislation can identify
and reconcile the unique problems that timesharing presents. In particu-
lar, comprehensive timeshare legislation can avoid the confusion caused
by the myriad regulations, laws, and authorities presently governing
timeshare projects.258
There are presently two model acts available for adoption throughout
the country. 259 The first, the Model Real Estate Time-Share Act
STAT. §§ 38-33-110 to -111 (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1045 (West Supp. 1983); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 588 (Supp. 1982-1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-7A-3 (1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-36.1-1.03 (Supp. 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-3 (Supp. 1981). For
a survey and comparison of state legislative responses to timesharing, see Bloch, supra note
235, at 295-96; Comment, supra note 7, at 222-36.
257. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 295 (laws not appropriate or adequate to govern
timeshares); Comment, supra note 5, at 442-43 (regulations a step in right direction but
lack comprehensiveness needed to resolve problems associated with timesharing). As one
author has noted:
The myried [sic] of legal and practical problems associated with timesharing
have [sic] attracted regulatory interest, but the regulatory agencies' responses
have aggravated the industry's problems. The variety of regulations promul-
gated and applied to timesharing demonstrate the urgent need for a single com-
prehensive approach. Moreover, the patchwork of agencies is inadequate to deal
with the problems associated with timesharing, thus hindering its acceptance.
The confusion creates a favorable environment for the few unscrupulous devel-
opers who structure projects to avoid all forms of registration. Although regula-
tory interest is instigated by these developers, the fragmented state of current
regulation prevents regulatory forces from reaching the very activities they hope
to control.
Comment, Unique froperoy, supra note 107, at 642 (footnote omitted). Thus, the author
concludes comprehensive legislation is the only solution. Id. at 644.
258. See Gunnar, supra note 7, at 44-45; see also Davis, supra note 199, at 120 (discussion
of various laws affecting timeshare projects in Florida); Martin, supra note 6, at 2809 (myr-
iad of federal, state, and local laws have impact on timesharing); Comment, supra note 21,
at 307-08 (variety of regulatory schemes creates confusion). One commentator has stated:
The present confused, duplicative, and often conflicting regulations are self-
defeating. They result either in legal avoidance of salutary regulations or a lack
of enforcement. In addition, the excessive costs of complying with a multitude of
regulations are passed on to the purchaser. Thus neither the public nor the in-
dustry is benefited by the present situation.
Gunnar, supra note 7, at 45. Comprehensive timeshare legislation is considered "a blessing
when viewed by practitioners in states without any clear cut legislative view of where
timesharing actually fits." Davis, supra note 198, at 117.
259. See Podgers, supra note 4, at 543. For analyses and comparisons of the two pieces
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(MRETSA),260 was adopted by the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws. The second, the Model Time-Share Owner-
ship Act (RTC/NARELLO),26 1 was jointly adopted by the Resort
Timesharing Council of American Land Development Association and
the National Association of Real Estate License Law Officials.
MRETSA can better fulfill the state's needs. MRETSA borrows from,
and is drafted to complement the UCA262 (the model for the MUCA).263
MRETSA synthesizes many problem areas addressed by various
states,264 and anticipates "future problems which will arise as time-share
ownership becomes more prevalent."265 MRETSA focuses on the larger
goal of interstate uniformity.266 As compared to the
RTC/NARELLO,267 MRETSA provides balanced protection of pur-
of model legislation, see Pollack, supra note 7, at 295-301; Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 32;
Comment, Unique Property, supra note 107, at 644-52.
260. MRETSA, §§ 1-101 to 5-110 (Supp. 1983). For the history of the model act, see
supra note 66.
261. RTC/NARELLO Model Time-Share Act (1979), reprinted in M. HENZE, supra
note 35, app. 5. A revised discussion draft has been sent to industry leaders for comment.
Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 32. The RTC/NARELLO Act has been the model for
timeshare legislation adopted in South Carolina and Nebraska. Penwell, supra note 6, at
64. See Nebraska Time-Share Act NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1701 to -1741 (1981); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 27-32-10 to -230 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1982). RTC/NARELLO is to be sub-
mitted in Colorado and Nevada. Penwell, supra note 6, at 64.
262. MRETSA Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 259 (Supp. 1983); see Cata-
lina, supra note 7, at 148. The Uniform Condominium Act of 1977 was revised in 1980 for
adoption by the states. A number of states have adopted in whole or in part versions of
the Uniform Condominium Act. See U.C.A. §§ 1-101 to 5-110 (1977).
263. MINN. STAT. §§ 515A.1-101 to .4-118 (1982); see Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 32.
264. MRETSA Commissioner's Prefatory Note, 7A U.L.A. 259 (Supp. 1983).
265. Id
266. Id. The Prefatory Note states:
Uniform legislation appeared desirable for many reasons. Uniformity is impor-
tant to the multi-state purchasers and national lenders who find it difficult to
assess the appropriateness of varying real estate documents and financing ar-
rangements in the several states. Uniformity is particularly important with re-
gard to timeshare ownership because most real estate timesharing involves
recreational or resort property, and consequently more multi-state relationships
exist than with other types of real estate. Moreover, multistate exchange pro-
grams for time-share owners have been introduced and are being rapidly ex-
panded. Consequently, uniformity appeared especially desirable in view of the
fact that a higher proportion of purchasers in timeshare properties is likely to be
from outside the state in which the property is located than in any other type of
real estate sales. The desirability of uniformity will become even more impor-
tant as timesharing, in all of its various forms, continues to become more
widespread.
d.
267. For a comparison of the two Acts, see supra note 259. The revised draft of the
RTC/NARELLO Act, supra note 261, provides more detail for management responsibili-
ties, advertising standards, and purchaser cancellation rights. Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at
32 (citing 3 TIME-SHARING LAW REPORTER BRIEFS, at 9 (April 1982)); NAT'L L.J., at 34-
35 (May 10, 1982)).
19841
37
et al.: Regulating Timeshare Interests in Minnesota: A Comprehensive Solu
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1984
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
chasers and developers268 and strong regulatory measures.2 69
MRETSA addresses many important corollary concerns of timeshar-
ing. It recognizes the fee simple timeshare interest, 2 70 commonly referred
to as the chronometric fee. 27 1 MRETSA also addresses the conversion
problem by requiring that owners of at least eighty percent of the units
consent to the conversion to timesharing.2 72 It includes provisions for
termination of timeshare interests 273 that remedy the problems associ-
ated with the right to partition.2 74 In addition, MRETSA addresses the
consumer protection concerns 275 raised in many state regulatory ef-
forts, 276 and provides separate assessment for tax purposes.
2 77
268. See Pollack, supra note 7, at 297; see also Catalina, supra note 7, at 148 (MRETSA
addresses every aspect of timesharing from nature of interests created to consumer
protection).
269. See Podgers, supra note 4, at 544.
270. MRETSA § 1-103(a) (Supp. 1983). This section provides in relevant part:
[N]otwithstanding any contrary rule of common law, a grant of an estate in a
unit conferring the right of possession during a potentially infinite number of
separated time periods creates an estate in fee simple having the character and
incidents of such an estate at common law, and a grant of an estate in a unit
conferring the right of possession during [5] or more separated time periods over
a finite number of years equal to [5] or more, including renewal options, creates
an estate for years having the character and incidents of such an estate at com-
mon law.
Id. This concept is recognized only in Utah. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-6 (Supp. 1981)
(reprinted supra note 71); supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
271. See Comment, Innovative Concept, supra note 44, at 445; Comment, supra note 21, at
315. The Commissioners' comment to section 1-103 of MRETSA states that the "One
purpose . . . is to assure that a time share estate for years is recognized by the courts as a
single estate for years, with all the usual common law incidents thereto." MRETSA § I-
103 Commissioner's comment (Supp. 1983).
272. See MRETSA § 1-201 (Supp. 1983); see also Comment, Twilight Zone, supra note
107, at 411-12 (discussing owners' consent to conversion). A number of states that have
timeshare legislation place some form of restriction on the conversion of existing units to
timeshare estates. Id. at 411; see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 718.1045 to. 110(8) (West Supp.
1982); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 514E-5 (Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1701 to -1741
(1980); VA. CODE §§ 55-360 to -400 (1981).
273. MRETSA § 2-105 (Supp. 1983). This provision deals with the harsh reality that
timeshare interests are estates for years, terminable by terms of the conveyancing instru-
ment. It also recognizes that certain owners (forming a majority) may choose to terminate
and convey the remainder of their estates in the unit to prospective purchasers. Id
MRETSA requires approval by eighty percent of the timeshare owners and a termination
agreement vefore an estate may be conveyed. See id. § 2-105(b),(c). See generally Burek,
supra note 67, at 686; Comment, supra note 21, at 316 (analysis of MRETSA's termination
provision).
274. To effect termination, a partition must expressly be provided for in the timeshare
instrument. MRETSA § 2-104 (Supp. 1983).
275. Id. §§ 4-101 to -117 (Supp. 1983).
276. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
277. See MRETSA § 1-103(b) (Supp. 1983). Section 1-103(b) provides:
Each time-share estate constitutes for all purposes a separate estate in real prop-
erty. Each time-share estate [other than a time-share estate for years] must [not]
be separately assessed and taxed. [Notices of assessments and bills for taxes must
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Several MRETSA provisions remove timesharing from the guise of se-
curities regulation. 278 It defines an "offering" as "any advertisement, in-
ducement, solicitation, or attempt to encourage any person to acquire a
timeshare, other than as a security for an obligation. "279 It contains an op-
tional provision stating that timeshare interests are not securities for state
law purposes.
280
In the area of financing, 28 1 MRETSA specifically provides for the
rights of secured lenders282 and helps to alleviate lenders' concerns over
the unique nature of the interest used to secure their loan.283 MRETSA
provides for escrow accounts284 in a provision similar to its counterpart
in the MUCA.285
MRETSA offers a unique solution to the problems of owner input and
control 286 in the management area.2 8 7 It permits timeshare owners to
exercise a significant measure of self-government 288 through initiative,
referendum, and recall.289 This approach solves the problems involved
in maintaining a board of directors.29° Finally, MRETSA provides that
be furnished to the managing entity, if any, or otherwise to each time-share own-
er, but the managing entity is not liable for the taxes as a result thereof.]
Id. (state has discretion to include bracketed material). On the issue of tax assessment
policies for timesharing purposes, see supra notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
278. For a discussion of the applicability of securities regulations to timesharing, see
supra notes 78-106 and accompanying text.
279. MRETSA § 1-102(8) (Supp. 1983) (emphasis added); see also id § 1-102(19)
(timeshare owner means "a person who is an owner or co-owner of a time-share other than
as a security for an obligation").
280. Id § 4-105. The MRETSA provides the state with optional language to construe
the timeshare interest in terms other than as a security. Id.
281. See supra notes 129-50 and accompanying text.
282. MRETSA § 2-107 (Supp. 1983). MRETSA provides:
The time-share instrument may require that all or a specified number or per-
centage of the mortgagees or beneficiaries of deeds of trust encumbering units or
time-shares approve specified actions of the unit owners, time-share owners, de-
veloper, or managing entity as a condition to the effectiveness of those actions,
but no requirement for approval may operate to (i) deny or delegate control over
the general administrative affairs of any association by the unit owners, time-
share owners, or both, or their elected representatives, or (ii) prevent any associa-
tion from commencing, intervening in, or settling any litigation or proceeding, or
receiving and distributing any insurance proceeds pursuant to Section 3-108.
Id See generally Burek, supra note 67, at 686 (discussing this provision).
283. See supra notes 167-80 and accompanying text.
284. MRETSA § 4-108 (Supp. 1983).
285. See MINN. STAT. § 515A.4-108 (1982), reprinted supra note 140.
286. See Catalina, supra note 7, at 149.
287. See supra notes 167-80 and accompanying text.
288. See td., Burek, supra note 67, at 689; Rosenblatt, supra note 1, at 32.
289. MRETSA §§ 3-114 to 3-117 (Supp. 1983).
290. The Commissioner's comment to sections 3-114 to 3-117 of MRETSA states:
The reason for resorting to these devices is the impracticality of assuring self-
government for time-share owners through the usual techniques that are em-
ployed in projects occupied by year-round residents. In most such projects, it is
possible for the unit owners to become well acquainted with one another and to
19841
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liens imposed by the managing entity attach to the delinquent owner's
timeshare rather than the entire unit,291 thus enhancing management's
ability to levy and collect assessments.
IV. CONCLUSION
Comprehensive timeshare legislation merits careful consideration by
the Minnesota Legislature. Such examination will reveal that timeshar-
ing is a workable concept and is becoming an increasingly popular alter-
native in recreational housing. Minnesota will inevitably require
legislation to avoid predictable legal dilemmas and to assuage the justifi-
able apprehensions which accompany timesharing.
The timeshare experience of other states can serve as a foundation for
possible approaches to these problems. Five states have enacted compre-
hensive timeshare legislation within the past two years - Florida,2 92 Ha-
waii,293 Nebraska, 294 Tennessee,2 9 5 and Virginia.296 With its own
comprehensive timeshare plan, Minnesota can become part of the move-
ment;29 7 enacting a concise statutory framework, capturing its share of a
billion dollar industry,2 98 and providing its citizens with an innovative
elect from their own ranks a board of directors to manage the project or at least
regulate the professional management. In a time-share project, however, there is
a large number of different groups of time-share owners, with each group in
residence at different times during the year. Members of any one group have
little enough opportunity to get to know one another, much less the members of
other groups, and a time-share owner would find it very difficult to assume year-
round responsibilities as a member of the project's board of directors. Even at-
tendance at a single annual meeting would be impractical for most time-share
owners not actually in residence at the time that meeting is held.
Id. § 3-114 Commissioner's comment (Supp. 1983); see Burek, supra note 67, at 689; Cata-
lina, supra note 7, at 149.
291. See MRETSA § 3-111 (Supp. 1983).
292. See Florida Real Estate Time-Sharing Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 721.01-.28 (West
Supp. 1982). For an analysis of this Act, see Langer, Florida Real Estate Thr-Sharing Act, in
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF REAL ESTATE TIMESHARING 405 (P.L.I. Real Estate Law And
Practice No. 220, 1982); see also Davis, supra note 198, at 116 (discussing Florida Time-
Sharing Act).
293. See HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 514E-l to -15 (Supp. 1981).
294. See Nebraska Time Share Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-1701 to -1741 (1981).
295. See Tennessee Time-Share Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-32-101 to -130 (1982).
296. See Virginia Real Estate Time-Share Act, VA. CODE §§ 55-360 to -400 (1982).
297. Comprehensive timeshare legislation has been proposed in Colorado but has not
been adopted. Straw, szpra note 150, at 1544 n.3. Such legislation may also be proposed
in Alabama. See Davis, Time Share Ownership of Condominiums, 44 ALA. LAW. 183, 185
(1983). Two other states, Wisconsin and Nevada, are contemplating less comprehensive
timeshare legislation. See Comment, Unique Property, supra note 107, at 654-55. In a recent
law review comment, the authors proposed a comprehensive model timeshare act for the
state of Georgia. See Comment, Twiight Zone, supra note 107, at 417-31.
298. See Ellsworth, supra note 7, at 443. Minnesota is currently examining many pro-
posals to bolster its sagging economy, including a proposal by Governor Perpich to quad-
ruple the state tourism budget to $6.2 million. Perpzch Vows Bold Economic Steps, Mpls. Star
and Tribune, Jan. 5, 1983, at IA, col. 1-3, 5A, col. 1-3. A proposal for prophylactic legisla-
[Vol. I0
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1984], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol10/iss1/8
1984] REGULA TING TIMESHARE INTERESTS
form of recreational housing.
tion can easily accompany an effort to increase tourism. Utilization of timesharing can
increase tax revenues through new development and foster economic growth for surround-
ing economies. See Comment, supra note 21, at 319.
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